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ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on understanding the organizational decision-making process that
occurs at the theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC) level of command during times of
conflict or war. This thesis is descriptive in nature and concerns the process used to
make decisions: it makes no attempt to judge the appropriateness of the process or the
quality of the decisions. Using a video record of a seminar-format war game as a data
source, the author viewed a theater CINC level decision-making group, coded the
decisions, and recorded observations. Subsequent analysis resulted in the generation of
hypotheses and conclusions. The author concludes that organizational decision making
at the theater CINC level uses a combination of decision processes, with the process
depicted by the Carnegie model being the most prevalent. The decision-making group
places an emphasis upon goal consensus, and their state of technical knowledge is
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Much of the previous research on military decision making has focused on decisions
made by individuals at levels of command where the decision outcomes are rapidly
apparent and relatively easy to quantify. However, the process used by organizations is
inherently more complex than the process used by individuals, since organizations are
composed of individuals that must interact on a social, as opposed to a solitary, basis
(Vroom and Yetton, 1973, pp.4-5). Consequently, organizational decision-making groups,
or decision makers, are subject to both cognitive and affiliative constraints (Janis, 1989,
p.4 5 ).
While it is difficult to identify the quality of decisions made at the theater
Commander-in-Chief (CINC) level of command, it is possible to look at the decision-
making process. Research indicates that the process which an organization uses to make
decisions is related to the organizations performance (Janis, 1989, p. 128; Fredrickson and
Mitchell, 1984, p.399). Rohrbaugh has suggested that in dealing with a group of experts,
the way to evaluate their effectiveness is by directing attention to the process used by the
group, not the subsequent outcome (Rohrbaugh, 1987, p.257).
This thesis focuses jn gaining an understanding of the organizational decision-
making process used at the theater CINC level of command, an echelon that has been
generally overlooked. This thesis makes no attempt to evaluate the effectiveness or
quality of decisions.
B. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The research question which guided this research is "What organizational models
of decision making can characterized theater CINC warfighting decisions?" Secondary
questions contained within the primary question are:
1. Is there goal consensus within the decision-making group and how is it reached?
2. What is the technical knowledge of the decision-making group; i.e., the degree of
understanding and agreement about how to achieve the organizational goals?
3. What is the research utility of using video records of theater CINC war games to
analyze the theater CINC organizational warfighting decision process?
C. SCOPE
The domain of this thesis is the organizational decision-making process that occurs
at the theater CINC level of command during times of conflict or war. This thesis is
descriptive in nature and concerns the process actually used to make decisions: it makes
no attempt to determine the appropriateness of the process or to judge the quality of the
decisions made. The research was limited by a lack of published domain related data or
research and the present absence of a war or conflict. In lieu of real-world data the
author used a video record of a theater CINC war game as the data source.
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D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The author found that the theater CINC operates in an external environment that
encompasses "high-velocity" environments; environments which are characterized by
constantly changing conditions.
The decision process which occurs at the theater CINC level is different, in the time
sense, from junior levels of command. The theater CINC is called uponx to make fewer
decisions within the same time period as the junior commands and therefore has more
time available for each decision.
The theater level CINC uses a combination of decision processes. These processes
include:
1. The management science model
2. The Carnegie model
3. The incremental decision process model
4. A composite process which is a sequential combination of the Carnegie model and
the incremental decision process
5. A "bounded" management science model wheie judgment is used in place of
analysis
The theater CINC and his subordinate commanders initially display a low goal
consensus for unfamiliar problems and a high goal consensus for familiar problems. The
group reaches a goal consensus for unfamiliar problems by having an open discussion that
continues until a general consensus emerges. The CINC uses consensus with
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qualification, a technique which is useful in resolving all but the most serious conflicts
within a group and incrthses the speed with which decisions can be made.
The theater CINC and his subordinates are familiar with the situation of full scale
conflict with the Soviet Union and consequently have a high goal consensus when they
are faced with this situation. When faced with deciding war deterrence or war
termination actions for an unfamiliar external environment, the group initially displays a
low goal consensus and looks to the NCA to establish the military goals. In the absence
of specific military goals and objectives from the NCA, the group develops their own
consensus on military objectives and adopts an incremental military strateg)
The group exhibits a high state of technical knowledge when operating within an
environment that is within their sphere of influence, or which is familiar to them, and
when the environment remains stable over the time required for the group to achieve their
organizational goal. However, when operating within an environment that involves other
forces, such as the Soviet's, the group's understanding of how to achieve their
organizational goal is limited, in the time scale sense, by the uncertainty of the
environment. When this type of environment occurs the group exhibi,s a low state of
technical knowledge. Solutions are selected through a bargaining process, and the group
uses incremental solutions to compensate for uncertainty in the environment.
The process characterized by the Carnegie model is used more frequently than any
other process. The time required to rr:ke a decision is related to goal consensus and to
technical knowledge. Decisions take the least amount of time when there is a high goal
consensus and a high state of technical knowledge, and these conditions lead to the
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decision process depicted by the management science model. Decisions take longer to
reach when there is a low goal consensus or a low state of technical knowledge.
Decisions take the longest when both goal consensus and technical knowledge are low,
and the resulting decision process can be characterized by a composite of the Carnegie
and the incremental decision process models.
Video records of theater CINC war games are valuable sources of data on
organizational decision making at this generally unexplored level of command. Much of
the research done on military decision making has been focused on levels of command
that are junior to the theater CINC.
The theater CINC plays a vital role in determining the theater wide military goals
and strategies during a war or conflict.
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
In Chapter HI the author discusses existing models of organizational decision making
and provides the foundation for understanding the conclusions. Chapter III contains a
general description of the observed war game. In Chapter IV the author covers the
method used to observe the war game. Chapter V presents the data: a compilation of the
authors observations and a brief description of each of decisions made by the decision-
making group. The author's analysis of the observations is contained in Chapter VI.
Chapter VII builds upon the previous chapters to develop hypotheses on decision making
at the theater CINC level. In Chapter VIII the author documents lessons learned.
Chapter IX contains the conclusions and summarizes the answers to the research question.
5
The variables used to code the observed decisions are located in Appendix A while the
results of the coding and a daily timeline of the decisions are contained in Appendix B.
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H. CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES
Decision making can be looked at from many different angles. When decision
making is studied empirically, different approaches can lead to confusion unless there is
a clear understanding of the model domain.
Decisions are usually divided into two large categories based upon the entity that
is making the decision: individuals or organizations. Within each category it is possible
to have further divisions and look at (1) the actual decision that was reached, or (2) the
process by which the decision was reached. Put in other terms, it is possible to draw a
box around the decision and limit the observations and analysis to the inputs and outputs,
or it is possible to look only at what happens inside the box. Models that deal with the
decision itself are commonly referred to as structural models. Models that deal with how
the decision was reached are called process models. In their discussion of decision
making and decision theory, Abelson and Levi make the following distinctions:
Structural models describe the observable input/output relationships for decision
behavior. In contrast, process models are concerned with the dynamic aspects of
decision making, with the heuristics and algorithms that people use in dealing with
decision problems. Structural models focus on the what of decision behavior, but
process models focus on the how. (Abelson and Levi, 1985, p.254)
The investigator may be concerned either with what the decision maker chooses or
with how choices are made. The former orientation leads to a study of input/output
relationships, i.e., with the structure of sets of choices made under specified
conditions. The latter promotes analysis of the intervening steps in the cognitive
processing of choice situations. (Abelson and Levi, 1985, p.232)
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The domain of decision models can be reduced even further. Structural and process
models can restrict themselves to describing chat will happen, or they can model what
should happen for a high quality decision. Normative models are concerned with
optimizing the quality of the decision, or decision process, while descriptive models limit
the model domain to what has been observed to actually occur. Vroom and Yetton have
noted the difference between normative models and descriptive models as they pertain to
the decision process:
"Two theoretically distinct sets of questions can be asked concerning the manager's
choice of a decision process. One contains the normative questions as to which
process should be used to make the decision. The other consists of the descriptive
questions concerning which decision-making process would actually be used."
(Vroom and Yetton, 1973, p.6)
The domain of this thesis is the organizational decision-making process that occurs
at the theater CINC level of command. The author has no basis for judging the quality
of the decisions that were reached during the observed war game and accordingly has
limited the discussion and application of decision process models to descriptive models.
This chapter includes descriptions of both individual and organizational descriptive
decision process models. The individual models are included because they have
counterparts in the organizational models, and organizations are composed of individuals
who make their own decisions and then interact to make organizational decisions.
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A. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING
1. Rational Model
The rational model assumes that the decision maker is rational and when faced
with a problem will systematically analyze the problem, explore all reasonable solutions,
and chose the solution that best advances the decision maker's interests. Daft breaks the
rational model down into the following eight steps:
1. Monitor the Decision Environment
2. Define the Decision Problem
3. Specify Decision Outcomes
4. Diagnose the Problem
5. Develop Alternative Solutions
6. Evaluate Alternatives
7. Choose the Best Alternative
8. Implement the Chosen Alternative
(Daft, 1989, p. 3 5 7 )
2. Bounded Rational Model
The bounded rational model is used to explain deviations from the rational
model. The rational model assumes that there are no time pressures, no limits on
resources, the actor will behave rationally, and there is negligible uncertainty. In contrast.
the bounded rational model takes into account the constraints and limits put on the
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decision maker. Under actual conditions a complete analysis is often impossible or the
decision maker may not think that the decision warrants a formal analysis. The decision
could be about what something the decision maker considers as minor or of limited
relevance. Weick noted that:
The essence of this notion is that individuals have perceptual as well as
information-processing limits, and even though they may intend to act rationally,
they can do so only in a limited fashion. This limited fashion consists of acting on
the basis of sufficient knowledge rather than complete knowledge (the concept of
satisficing); of using simple, unlaborious rules to search for a solution when a
problem arises (e.g., searching in the immediate vicinity of the problem); and of
using shortcuts whenever possible. (Weick, 1979, p.20)
Intuition is often associated with the bounded rational model, and when this
occurs judgment and experience substitute for analysis (Daft, 1989, p.360). This is not
as arbitrary as it may seem, for intuition is based upon past experience. Past experience
allows an individual to perceive patterns and process information without going through
a deliberate chain of reasoning (Benderly, 1989, pp.36-40).
B. ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING
Organizational decision making is more complex than individual decision making,
for it involves both individual decision making and social interaction. In his discussion
of the cuban missile crisis, Anderson has noted that: "...understanding organizational
decision making.. .requires integrating the behavioral aspects of individual information
processing and decision making with the social and symbolic interaction views of
organizations." (Anderson, 1983, p.202) Vroom and Yetton have also written about the
differences between individual and organizational decision making:
10
It can be argued, however, that the processes of problem-solving and decision-
making when carried out by organizations are different from the same processes
carried out by individuals in at least one fundamental respect. Organizational
decision-making involves both cognitive and social processes. The events that
intervene between the identification of a problem (or occasion for decision-making)
and a solution or decision are both intrapersonal and interpersonal. It is the
interpersonal or social aspects of decision-making that are of most relevance to
processes of leadership. The leader not only makes decisions but also designs,
regulates, and selects social systems that make decisions. (Vroom and Yetton, 1973,
pp.4-5)
Decisions made by organizations often involve multiple individuals, and each of these
individuals may act rationally, or with bounded rationality. The individuals may have
different objectives, concerns, and backgrounds. In addition to individual cognitive
constraints the organizational decision-making group is also subject to another set of
affiliative constraints. These constraints may include a need for approval, acceptability,
or support from the other group members (George, 1980, p.2).
In 1969 Allison described three organizational decision-making process models: (1)
the rational policy model, (2) the organizational model, and (3) the bureaucratic politics
model (Allison, 1986, p.312). In 1972 March suggested an additional model: the garbage
can model (Huber and McDaniel, 1986, p.578). The models introduced and described by
Allison and March have become the standards. They have been given different names
by various authors but the classification and descriptions of the models have generally
remained the same. Pennings refers to the four organizational decision-making process
models as (1) the rational model, (2) the bounded rational model, (3) the political model,
and (4) the garbage can model (Pennings, 1986, p.219). Bui also discusses the four
models but uses a different set of names:
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At least four basic classes of models must be mentioned: (i) the
program/bureaucratic model, (ii) the rational choice model, (iii) the political model,
and (iv) the cybernetic/garbage can model." (Bui and Jarke, 1987, p.6)
In his discussion of organizational decision making, Daft refers to the four models
as (1) the management science model, (2) the Carnegie model, (3) the incremental
decision process model, and (4) the garbage can model (Daft, 1989, p.363). Within this
theses the author has chosen to adopt the tidles used by Daft.
1. Management Science Model
The management science model is the organizational equivalent of the
individual rational model. This model stresses the systematic use of analytic tools to
evaluate alternatives and to solve problems. "The rational agent selects the alternative
whose consequences rank highest in terms of his goals and objectives." (Allison, 1986,
p.316) This approach is an excellent choice when "...problems are analyzable and when
the variables can be identified and measured." (Daft, 1989, p.364)
2. Carnegie Model
The Carnegie model takes into account the political aspects of organizations
and the bounded rationality of individuals. Allison has included the following in his
description of the model: "The techniques employed in this process often resemble those
used in legislative assemblies, though outcomes in the sense that what happens is not
chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, coalition,
competition, and confusion among government officials who see different faces of an
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issue; political in the sense that the activity from which the outcomes emerge is best
characterized as bargaining." (Allison, 1986, 330)
According to the model the use of coalitions and compromise have a
significant impact upon the search procedures used to generate alternatives and solutions.
Instead of generating optimal solutions the organization choses the first one that will
satisfy the individual members. If the organization can not reach an compromise or
coalition, then the results can be disastrous (Daft, 1989, p.366) In his discussion of the
Carnegie model, Daft points out that it is often associated with upper management:
The Carnegie model points out that building agreement through a managerial
coalition is a major part of organizational decision making. This is especially true
at upper management levels. Discussion and bargaining ar time-consuming, so
search procedures are usually simple, and the selected alternative satisfices rather
that optimizes problem solution. (Daft, 1989, p.366)
3. Incremental Decision Process Model
This model emphasizes the fact that many major decisions are made through
a series of small decisions. Decision makers are often constrained by previous decisions,
established procedures, or an unwillingness to radically deviate from established patterns.
Decision makers often proceed along a course by taking small steps. If they run into a
barrier, or failure, they cycle back through a previous decision and try something new
(Daft, 1989, p.369). Allison's organizational model is analogous to the incremental
decision process model. In describing his model he writes:
Major lines of organizational action are straight, i.e., behavior at one time is
marginally different from that behavior at t-l. Simpleminded predictions work best:
Behavior at t+l will be marginally different from behavior at the present time.
(Allison, 1986, p.324)
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George states that "...a decisionmaker employing the incremental strategy will consider
a narrow range of policy alternatives that differ only slightly from existing policies and
aim at securing marginal rather than dramatic improvements." (George, 1980, p.40)
4. Garbage Can Model
The garbage can model attempts to explain how decisions are made when the
organization is subjected to a high degree of ambiguity in technology, preferences, and
participation. Organizations that meet this criteria have been labeled as organized
anarchies (March, Cohen, and Olsen, 1986, p.285). The garbage can model differs from
the other models because it applies to the flow of multiple decisions within organizations
(Daft, 1989, p.373) and assumes that decision makers, problems, and solutions all interact
on a random basis. March and Olsen have written the following about their model:
In pure form, the garbage can model assumes that problems, solutions, decision
makers and choice opportunities are independent, exogenous streams flowing
through a system (Cohen et al., 1972). They are linked in a manner determined by
their arrival and departure times and any structural constraints on the access of
problems, solutions and decision makers to choice opportunities. In the absence of
structural constraints within a garbage can process, solutions are linked to problems,
and decision makers to choices, primarily by their simultaneity. (March and Olsen,
1986, p.17)
In the garbage can model the decision-making process is not a logical sequence of events.
Solutions may appear before problems, or in search of problems to attach themselves to,
and problems may exist without ever being solved. Daft identifies four consequences of
the garbage can model:
1. Solutions may be proposed even when problems do not exist
2. Choices are made without solving problems
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3. Problems may persist without being solved
4. A few problems are solved
(Daft, 1989, pp.375-376)
5. Composites
It is possible to have a single decision-making process that encompasses both
the Carnegie model and the incremental decision process model. If the problem is
ambiguous, the decision-making group needs to reach some sort of consensus about the
problem. Once this is accomplished, the group can proceed to solution generation and
selection. If the solutions are ambiguous the group may use the incremental decision
process qnd proceed on a trial-and-error basis. In this situation the Carnegie model would
be applicable for the problem identification and the incremental decision process model
would be applicable for the solution selection.
C. CONTINGENCY DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
The contingency decision-making framework is used as a means of explaining how
organizational settings and characteristics encourage t.e use of the different decision
processes. The framework states that analyzing organizations along the dimensions of
goal consensus and technical knowledge will indicate which decision process will be used
to make decisions. (Daft, 1989, p.378)
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1. Goal Consensus
Goal consensus refers to the level of agiaement among the decision-making
group. Goal consensus is most obvious in the problem identification phase of the
decision. Groups that have a low goal consensus must put special emphasis on (1)
coalition building during the decision process and (2) determining standards of
performance that are acceptable to the group. Certain organizational structures encourage
low goal consensus by having departments or divisions that specialize in different
environments. (Daft, 1989, p.378)
2. Technical Knowledge
"Technical Knowledge refers to the understanding and agreement about how
to reach organizational goals." (Daft, 1989, p.379) In order to understand how to reach
organizational goals the group must have (1) knowledge of the environment that is
germane to the problem and (2) the requisite technical skills. Technical knowledge is
most visible during the solution generation phase of the decision-making process.
3. Contingency Decision-Making Framework
Figure 1 shows how goal consensus and technical knowledge affect the
decision characteristics. According to the definition of goal consensus, a high goal
consensus leads to low uncertainty in problem identification while a low goal consensus
leads to high uncertainty in problem identification. Likewise, a high technical knowledge
leads to low uncertainty in solution generation while a low technical knowledge leads to




High Cell 1 Cell 2
Problem: low uncertainty Problem: high uncertainty
Solution: low uncertainty Solution: low uncertainty
Technical
Knowledge Cell 3 Cell 4
Problem: low uncertainty Problem: high uncertainty
Solution: high uncertainty Solutior: high uncertainty
Low
Source: (Daft, 1989, p.380)
Figure I. Integration of Der' Characteristics with Contingency
Decision-Making Frau.. wrk
Figure 2 is a graphic representation of the framework and translates the decision
characteristics (levels of uncertainty) into decision process models. In his description of
the framework Daft states:
Goals and technical knowledge determine the extent to which problem identification
and solution stages are uncertain. Depending on the situation, an organization may
have to focus on gaining goal consensus, increasing technical knowledge, or both.
Low uncertainty means that rational, analytical procedures can be used. High
uncertainty leads to greater use of judgement, bargaining, and other less systematic
procedures. (Daft, 1989, p.379)
Cell I indicates that groups with high goal consensus and high technical knowledge will
be inclined to use the management science model to decision making. Celi 2 indicates
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that groups with low goal consensus and high technical knowledge will resort to the
process of coalition building and bargaining represented by the Carnegie model. Cell 3
has high goal consensus but low technical knowledge. Accordingly, the group will have
agreement on what to do but will have to resort to the incremental decision making
process to arrive at solutions. Cell 4 has low goal consensus and low technical
knowledge. To reach a decision under these circumstances the framework indicates that
the group will have to use coalition building and bargaining (the Carnegie model) to reach
an agreement on the problem and then use the incremental decision making process to
generate a solution. If an organization experiences a large percentage of decisions that
fit this description, then the organization may be an organized anarchy, and the garbage
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Source: (Daft, 1989, p.3 8 1)
Figure 2. Integration of Decision Models with Contingency
Decision-Making Framework
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MI. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE OBSERVED WAR GAME
A. PURPOSE
The main purpose of the war game was to explore the command's response to an
external environment that was unfamiliar, strategically different, to the group but
considered within the realm of possibility. The game restricted itself to the examination
of political and military issues; social and economic issues generally were not considered.
The group was instructed to focus on the decision-making process, the objectives and
critical issues of the game, and war termination goals and strategies. The priorities for
each discussion period were given as war termination objectives, specific military
objectives to support the war termination objectives, command relationships, and the
employment and deployment of forces.
B. FORMAT
The game used a seminar format and played through a scenario that had been
previously approved by the theater CINC. The game was played over a three-day period,
and a critique was held on the fourth day. Each game day began with briefings and
situation updates, and these were followed by periods of discussion. The briefs and
discussions lasted for approximately one half of the day. Afternoons were used by the
various st,,ffs to execute the actions called for by the mornings decisions and to allow the
games controllers to perform assessments of these actions.
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The decision-making group was composed of 10 individuals who represented the
theater CINC, his subordinate commanders, and a senior controller. This group occupied
three sides of a large rectangular table, leaving the fourth side open for visual material
and briefers. The seating for the group was determined by protocol and seniority of rank:
the individual representing the theater CINC sat at the head of the table and the
individuals representing the junior personnel sat at the far end. The game room also
contained enough seating to accommodate approximately 40 to 50 additional people and
this seating was generally filled by observers, controllers, and the staffs of the individual
members of the decision-making group. Located within the room were two video
cameras which recorded the events and allowed additional staff and support personnel,
located in two separate rooms, to monitor the proceedings.
C. PARTICIPANTS
Numerous people participated in the war game in a variety of capacities. However,
for the purpose of this thesis, the term "participants" refers to the members of the
decision-making group. The participants were individuals who had been, or were on,
active duty and represented the senior levels of the United States military establishment:
the senior participant wore four stars, and the junior participant wore one stars. All of
the participants had held command at senior levels, and all had combat experience. The
educational levels of the participants were fairly comparable: each had attended one or
more of the top level military schools, and each held at least one graduate degree from
a nonmilitary school. All four of the services were represented, and tf.z. t"'ne in service
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ranged from approximately 30 to 40 years. The status and leadership relationships within
the decision-making group was set by the roles of the participants. The members of the
group were familiar with each other, and most had participated, as a group, in a previous





The game had been recorded on VHS cassettes. Two cameras had been mounted
in different locations within the game room and this resulted in two sets of tapes. The
author chose to work with the set of tapes that provided the best view of the decision-
making group. Each set of tapes held the record of 11 hours and 21 minutes worth of
events. The tapes contained all of the seminar sessions as well as the final critique held
on day four, which lasted two hours, and one hour of the afternoon working sessions
between the staffs and the controllers. The seminar sessions occupied a total of eight
hours and 21 minutes. This time was used as shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
USE OF GAME TIME
EVENT CUM TIME (HOUR:M[N) % OF TIME
Periods of Discussion 5:12 62.3





The author viewed the selected set of tapes a total of three times over a five-day
period. The purpose of the first viewing was to get a general impression of the game.
During the second viewing the author began identifying and coding decisions. In the
third viewing the author verified the coding and performed comparisons between the
decisions to ensure that the coding was as consistent as possible. Throughout each of the
viewings the author made use of the fast forward and rewind features to observe areas of
interest multiple times.
B. VARIABLES
The variables used to code the observed decisions are based upon decision theory.
The majority of these variables were obtained from published research articles on
organizational decision making; a few were originated by the author. The variables were
intended to provide an initial framework for structuring the author's observations. They
are by no means comprehensive and were not intended to provisionally test any
predetermined hypotheses. Rather, their purpose was to assist in the generation of
hypotheses. The variables, definitions, range of values, and rationale for selection are
contained in Appendix A.
C. CODING METHOD
In performing the coding the author let the complexity of the material determine
how much was coded each day and did not follow a set routine that specified the amount
of material to be coded within a fixed amount of time.
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Free form observations were also made for each decision. These observations were
made during the process of coding and were used to record information that the variables
could not capture. They included comments, impressions, thoughts, quotes, and
comparisons among the decisions. The combination of free form and coded observations
were used to describe the observed decisions and provide the basis for the analysis and
conclusions.
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V. WAR GAME OBSERVATIONS
A. GENERAL
During the course of the war game the author identified 13 decisions that were
placed before the CINC and his subordinates and that evolved from the group decision-
making process. These decisions were coded and the results, as well as a graphic
representation of the decision sequence for each day are contained in Appendix B. The
reader is encouraged to refer to Appendix B before continuing with this chapter.
The external environment met the definition of a "high-velocity environment"; an
environment where there is a rapid and discontinuous change in the availability and
disposition of friendly and hostile forces, technology, and political constraints on the
military options, such that the information used by the decision makers is often
inaccurate, incomplete, or obsolete. This was especially applicable, since each day of the
game was designed to cover the events expected to occur in 15 days of real time. The
decision-making environment was calm, professional, and business-like. Participants were
attentive and at times forceful, but they seldom raised their voices, and there were no
obvious personal differences or animosities. Although no single personality dominated
the process, the senior people provided the bulk of discussion and appeared to have the
most impact on the process and solutions. All of the participants were involved and, with
the exception of the controller, all had a direct interest in the decisions reached.
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The procedural norms that were used appeared to be familiar to the participants.
In most cases the participants took their lead from the CINC. An individual's ability to
clearly articulate his opinion or argument appeared to influence the impact he had on the
group. Humor was occasionally apparent, but it seemed to be personality and not
situation dependent. Over the three days occupied by the game it was evident that
decisions were also being made apart from the group under observation. The group's
discussions indicated that decisions were being made by the control team, staffs, and
various subgroups. The results of these decisions were evident even if their decision
process was not.
B. NARRATIVE OF ('BSERVED DECISIONS
1. Deci- r
Decision 1 occurred on the first day of the game and concerned the actions that
shoul J be taken to deter the likelihood of conflict with the Soviet Union given a particular
,ntemational situation and set of political constraints. The initial reaction of the group
was to fall back upon the existing operational plan for general war with the Soviet's,
regardless of the fact that the political constraints rendered the existing plan unfeasible.
The first four subordinates to speak recommended the existing operational plan. The
rationale expressed by these subordinates was that the Soviet's would see the U.S. begin
to implenmtent the war plan and conclude that the U.S. was serious about the particular
situation. Giving this impression to the Soviet's would act to deter them from aggressive
actions. One subordinate made the following comment: "We have gone through it (the
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operational plan) and through it, and that is, in our view, the best deterrence posture we
can take .....". The group began to consider a different solution only after the controller
pointed out that the group was not taking into account the political constraints, and that
the existing plan could not be implemented (in total) in the current situation.
After approximately 17 minutes of discussion the group took a break in order
to a request additional information from the National Command Authority (NCA) and
allow time for the request to be answered. The break was followed by a second period
of discussion, and then each subordinate was given the opportunity to present solutions.
The courses of action presented were modifications of the existing operational plan and
were partial solutions since each subordinate only presented what his command would (as
opposed to could or should) do.
This presentation of courses of action by subordinates was followed by rapid
consideration of decisions 2, 3, and 4; all in the space of six minutes. The focus of the
group then shifted back to the political constraints imposed on the situation and the
importance of having the NCA remove the constraints. This led to a third period of
discussion on deterrence and what courses of action to take. The discussion at this point
varied considerably from the previous discussions. Previous discussions had been
primarily about the deployment of forces. The new discussion also included the political
consequences of actions, implications of suggested actions on U.S. allies, a questioning
of what constitutes deterrence, and what assumptions had been made in executing the
guidance received from the NCA. The third discussion period was interrupted for
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approximately five minutes when the group recycled back to consider how to implement
decision 2. The third discussion period ended when the group decided to take a break.
After the break the subordinates were again asked to present solutions. Again,
each subordinate limited his solution to courses of action that his respective command
would take. Subordinates did not criticize or critique the solutions of other subordinates,
and it appeared that a general consensus had been reached. This final presentation of
solutions lasted 15 minutes. The decision reached by the group was to adopt a solution
that was a composite of the solutions presented by the subordinates.
2. Decision 2
Decision 2 occurred on the first day of the game and involved whether the
CINC should start the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). This topic had
been mentioned earlier (in the discussion of the solution for decision 1) when the CINC
talked about starting the TPFDD, so there appeared to be a preconceived assumption that
it should be started. The decision process took slightly more than one minute and began
when the CINC stated that "...want to get TPFDD going, do we not?" There was a
general concurrence among the subordinates and no answers to the negative. The
decision reached was to start the TPFDD in accordance with the existing operational plan.
The decision was brought up again approximately 30 minutes later. This second period
of discussion lasted approximately five minutes and never questioned the decision to start
the TPFDD; instead, it dealt with modifying the solution to accommodate the political
constraints imposed by the conditions of the game.
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3. Decision 3
Decision 3 occurred on the first day of the game and dealt with the issue of
deploying forces currently assigned to the CINC to another theater, i.e., give up forces.
The decision process took one and one-half minutes and there was a general consensus
within the group that no forces should be given up.
4. Decision 4
Decision 4 occurred on the first day of the game and concerned the courses
of action that should be taken in the event that deterrence efforts failed and conflict
occurred between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The initial period of discussion lasted
approximately three minutes. The subject of this discussion was limited to the initial
movements of forces, with the assumption that once conflict actually began they would
utilize the existing operational plan for general war with the Soviet's. Each subordinate
presented the initial moves that his command would make. Subordinates did not criticize
or critique the solutions of other subordinates. The final solution adopted by the CINC
was a composite of the solutions presented by the subordinates. The decision surfaced
again, approximately eight minutes later, when the CINC stated that in the event of war
they were going to execute the existing operational plan and asked if there were any




Decision 5 occurred on the second day of the game and involved the execution
of limited operations against the Soviet's; specifically, what courses of action should be
taken in the conduct of limited operations against the Soviet Union. The decision was
in process for approximately one minute when it was interrupted by consideration of
decision 6. The interruption occurred because one of the subordinates felt that decision
6 was related and needed resolution before the process could continue.
After decision 6 was reached the decision 5 process resumed. Subordinates
were given the opportunity to present the courses of action that their commands would
take. There was no general discussion period. The presentations had proceeded for
approximately 30 minutes when the process was interrupted by decision 7. This
interruption occurred when it became apparent to the subordinates that they had different
definitions of what the term "limited operations" meant.
The decision 5 process resumed after decision 7 was reached. The presentation
of courses of actions by subordinates took another four minutes to conclude and the group
then took a break in order to a request additional information from the NCA and allow
time for the request to be answered. After the break the CINC amended the courses of
action to incorporate the received information. This took three minutes. The final




Decision 6 occurred on the second day of the game and concerned whether a
particular U.S ally should be encouraged to become a co-belligerent, alongside the U.S.,
in the conflict with the Soviet Union. Additional information was required from the NCA
before the decision could be made, but, in the interest of keeping the game moving,
assumptions were made, and a decision was reached. The decision process took
approximately 13 minutes.
7. Decision 7
Decision 7 occurred on the second day of the game and dealt with the
definition of "limited operations"; specifically, what the NCA meant by the term "limited
operations". The decision process took approximately five minutes, and the decision
reached was to provide recommendations to the NCA and request guidance. The
recommendations provided to the NCA would be frr, atted as potential courses of action
and would be subject to NCA screening and approval.
8. Decision 8
Decision 8 occurred on the second day of the game and concerned the actions
that should be taken to conduct full scale military operations, as opposed to limited
operations, given the constraints of the culhent situation. Subordinates presented the
courses of action that their commands would take, and this presentation was followed by
a short period of discussion. Subordinates did not criticize or critique the solutions of
other subordinates and there was no discussion prior to the presentation of the courses of
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action. The combination of presentations and discussion took 31 minutes. The process
was then interrupted by a presentation of information about the Soviet perspective and
possible Soviet responses to U.S actions. After the interruption the discussion continued
for approximately two minutes before coming to an end. The final solution adopted by
the CINC was a composite of the courses of action presented by his subordinates.
9. Decision 9
Decision 9 occurred on the third day of the game and involved the availability
of the transportation required to move a particular unit. The decision process was
interrupted after approximately one minute when someone questioned the utility of
moving the unit, and the group proceeded to decision 10. Subsequent discussions reduced
the relevancy of the decision and the group never returned to decision 9.
10. Decision 10
Decision 10 occurred on the third day of the game, and concerned whether the
unit mentioned in decision 9 should be deployed or remain in place. Discussion focused
on what the main courses of action (employment and deployment of forces) should be for
this phase of the conflict. The post-war situation was mentioned briefly, but the
execution of the war effort remained the main interest of the group. The decision process
was interrupted, after approximately four minutes of discussion, when someone in the
group questioned what the overall military strategy was. The group proceeded to decision
11 and never returned to decision 10.
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11. Decision 11
Decision 11 occurred on the third day of the game, and concerned the actions
that should be taken to prepare for the termination of the conflict on conditions favorable
to the U.S. The group discussed different courses of action for approximately 28 minutes
before they appeared to arrive at a general consensus. The CINC then took six minutes
to summarize the discussion and provide guidance for the preparation of courses of action.
After the CINC's guidance the group took a break to allow the staffs time to work on
specific courses of action.
Upon returning from the break the CINC again summarized the previous
discussion and mentioned the assumptions that the group would have to make in the
absence of certain types of information. Subordinates were then given the chance to
present their respective courses of action. The ambiguities caused by the lack of
information resulted in the inclusion of a number of options in the courses of action.
Subordinates did not criticize or critique the solutions of other subordinates. The final
solution adopted by the CINC was a composite of the courses of action presented by his
subordinates. The final summarization and presentation of courses of action lasted 32
minutes.
12. Decision 12
Decision 12 occurred on the third day of the game and dealt with war
termination goals. A list of possible war termination goals was presented to the group
by the CLNC as a means of starting the discussion. The group did not exhibit the same
level of intensity as they did when discussing military actions, and the CINC had to prod
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his subordinates to get the discussion moving. The list of goals appeared to be accepted
with only minor modifications to the wording, but certain members of the group
expressed a desire for more specificity: they appeared to be looking for a conversion of
the goals into military objectives. This desire for specificity prompted the group to move
on to decision 13 after 15 minutes of discussion. The group never returned to decision
12.
13. Decision 13
Decision 13 occurred on the third day of the game and involved war
termination strategies; specifically, what the military strategies should be to support the
war termination goals. A list of possible war termination strategies was presented to the
group by the CINC as a means of starting the discussion. Participants suggested minor
changes to the strategies and appeared more reflective than in previous decisions. The
discussion continued for approximately 13 minutes and ended with the implicit acceptance




Selective bias is a phenomenon of cognition. It occurs when a decision maker or
decision-making group selectively filters the information that is accepted. A decision-
making group that exhibits selective bias:
... shows a definite tendency to accept new information from intelligence reports,
the testimony of experts, the mass media, and outside critics only when it supports
the preferred alternative. The members generally ignore or refute a number of
important pieces of nonsupporting information to which they are exposed. (Janis,
1989, p.33)
Selective bias was evident in decisions 1. 2, 4, and 8.
In decision 1, the group wanted to use an existing operational plan even though the
game's political constraints rendered the plan unfeasible. The first four participants to
speak all recommended the existing plan. The controller drew the group's attention to
the constraints, but the group tried to refute them. During the entire game the only time
the group questioned the information provided to them was when they questioned the
validity of the political constraints. The controller prevailed, and the group was forced
to consider courses of action other than the existing operational plan.
In decision 2, the group went back to rework their original solution because it did
not take into account the political constraints. The original solution to decision 2 was
reached approximately one hour after the group began to work on decision one, and in
view of the solution, it is obvious that at that time the group had not accepted the
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constraints. The solution rework occurred approximately one-half hour later. Sometime
during the half hour between the original solution and the reworked solution, the group
apparently decided that they would have to work within the constraints.
The solution for decision 4 was based upon the anticipated removal of the political
constraints in the near future. This assumption was optimistic according to the
information available to the group. The group still showed a reluctance to come to grips
with an external environment that was different from what was anticipated or practiced.
Decision four was reached prior to the rework of the decision 2 solution.
Decisions 1, 2, and 4 all occurred on the first day of the game and were all
subjected to the same selective bias, an unwillingness to accept an unanticipated external
environment. It took the group up to one and a half hours and required repeated
interventions from the controller before they overcame this bias.
The selective bias shown in decision 8 occurred when the group considered one of
the courses of action that eventually became a part of the decision 8 solution. This
particular course of action was to strike Soviet targets located in a neutral country.
Several members of the group pointed out that it was a neutral country, but the rest of
the group selectively ignored their comments and concentrated on the military aspects of
the strike. Key members of the group had a course of action in mind and filtered out any
information that did not support it. They also did not request additional information to
confirm the locations of the Soviet targets.
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B. UNCERTAINTY
Uncertainty adds emotional stress and complicates decision making. The degree of
uncertainty can affect the complexity of the decision process (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and
Theoret, 1976, p.247). Increased stress can impede information processing and can lead
to hesitancy in making decisions (George, 1980, pp.27-28, 37). The uncertainty that the
group fazced can be categorized as (1) uncertainty of present conditions and information
and (2) uncertainty of future conditions and events.
The group dealt with the uncertainty of the present by (1) using a directed telescope
to obtain the desired information (decisions 9 and 11), (2) requesting information or
clarification from the NCA (decisions 1, 5, 6, and 7), or (3) by making assumptions
(decisions 4, 6, and 11). The direction provided by the NCA was given in broad general
terms and caused the group the most difficulty. Four of the 13 decisions required
clarification from the NCA. Indeed, it appeared that the group had as much (or more)
difficulty in determining specifically what the NCA wanted as it had in determining what
the enemy would do. If the observed decisions are indicative of the decision process that
occurs at the theater CINC level in a time of crisis, then a way to speed up the process
is for the NCA to provide guidance that is more specific; of course, that may slow down
the NCA decision-making process. The trade-off associated with this is a reduction in
the CINC's flexibility.
The group dealt with the uncertainty of future by using incremental solutions.
Decisions 1, 5, 8 and 11 developed detailed courses of action and all were incremental
in nature; they only looked to the immediate future. Courses of action decisions occupied
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80.1% of the group's time, and decisions that were incremental, i.e.,"stop-gap", occupied
82.1% of the group's time. Decision 11 had so much uncertainty associated with it that
the solution included a number of options. This use of incremental solutions is entirely
consistent with the existing literature on decision making. George states:
The incremental approach recommends itself to leaders when they find it difficult
to obtain agreement on longer-range objectives and when knowledge and
information needed to devise more comprehensive plans to achieve them is in any
case lacking. Under these circumstances, a decisionmaker employing the
incremental strategy will consider a narrow range of policy alternatives that differ
only slightly from existing policies and aim at securing marginal rather than
dramatic improvements. (George, 1980, p.40)
Incrementalism is found in large organizations, both public and private and has been
referred to as a "least-effort" strategy (Janis, 1989, p.40) that enables decision makers to
"muddle through" (Lindbloom, 1959, p.88). This is not to impiy that incrementalism is
a defective strategy. The use of incrementalism has some significant advantages: it
reduces the chance of serious mistakes and allows the group to reach a consensus on a
temporarily adequate solution and proceed to something else, especially when information
is lacking. In a high-velocity environment delays can be costly, and the organization may
not be able to catch up if it allows itself to lag behind the changing situation.
Incrementalism also has hidden costs if the group substitutes it for long-range planning
and in doing so overlooks opportunities. Weissinger-Baylon evaluated a week-long war
game that was conducted at the Naval War College and found:
In the war game, flag decision makers and their staffs responded to intense load
and time pressure by attending to those choices that were temporarily more
attractive. This leads to behavior more like a computer time-sharing system than
like "fire fighting."
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Decision makers successively allocate small blocks of time to an important
choice. This continues until the choice is resolved or its problems have migrated
to other arenas. (Weissinger-Baylon, 1986, p.44)
This is a description of incrementalism. A problem is temporarily solved so that the
decision maker can proceed to something else before there is a catastrophic failure.
Perhaps this is what it takes to survive at the battle group or fleet level. If so, the
training which allows flag officers to succeed in combat may actually impede them when
they are placed in policy making or strategic positions. Incremental solutions are not a
substitute for policy analysis or strategic planning (George, 1980, p.41).
C. STIMULI FOR DECISIONS
The stimuli, i.e., agent, that prompted the observed decisions were evenly spread
among three different types as shown in Table 2. The percentage of time spent in
response to the different stimuli was not as evenly spread; the CINC only served as the
stimuli 11.8% of the time. This may be an artificiality of the game, since the CINC
approved the scenario in advance, and the game was played at his request. What is more
interesting is the lack of enemy stimuli. This may be due to the artificialities of the
game, or it may be a characteristic of decision making at the CINC level that unless
enemy stimuli are sharp and sudden, such as the attack on Pearl Harbor, they are buffered
and included in the CINC's perception of the external environment; they become a part
of the environment instead of a stimuli. Enemy stimuli act upon the people who are
actually facing the enemy, i.e., the subordinate commanders. The primary stimuli to the




STIMULI # DECISIONS CUM TIME % OF TIME
(MIN.SEC)
CINC 4 34.49 11.8
Staff 0 0.0 0.0
Subordinate 4 88.54 30.3
Commander
Above CINC 5 169.59 57.9
(NCA)
Enemy 0 0.0 0.0
Other 0 0.0 0.0
Total 13 I 293.42 100.0
Weissinger-Baylon evaluated a war game conducted by the Naval War College and
concluded that "Flag choices tend to be triggered by subordinate commanders, since these
officers are closest to information and can effectively identify problems and propose
solutions." (Weissinger-Baylon, 1986, p.47) The Naval War College war game was
conducted at the naval-force level where the force consisted of a "large battleship and
carrier task force in the Indian Ocean as well as amphibious forces, maritime
prepositioned forces and aircraft of the rapid deployment joint task force." (Weissinger-
Baylon, 1986, p.43) The decision-making environment observed by the author occurred
at a higher level of command and does not confirm Weissinger-Baylon's conclusion. hi
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the environment observed by the author, the subordinate commanders provided the stimuli
to four decisions. These decisions occupied only 30.3% of the time spent on decision
making. The four stimuli were provided by two of the eight subordinate commanders
which means that the other six subordinate commanders were content to let someone else
set the course.
D. DECISION TYPES
The predominate decision type was solution selection. As shown in Table 3, seven
decisions followed solution oriented paths. These decisions occupied 82.7% of the




DECISION TYPE # DECISIONS CUM TIME % OF TIME
(MJN.SEC)
Goal Definition 3 40.13 13.7
Information 1 0.56 0.3
Collection
Problem 2 9.36 3.3
Definition
Process 0 0.0 0.0
Solution Selection 7 242.57 82.7
Total 13 293.42 [ 100.0
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A possible reason for the group's concentration on solution-oriented decisions may
lie in what the group considered its task to be. Groups meet for a purpose, and how they
perceive their purpose influences how they react. Poole puts forth the argument that:
At least two distinct definitions of the decision task may occur, each of which
implies different ensembles of task components. In the first instance, a group may
look on a decision as a "full-fledged" problem which requires all components--
problem diagnosis, solution search, testing, and a decision. This interpretation is
assumed in most developmental theories, which take problem analysis as a
necessary condition of decision-making. In the second instance, a group may look
on a decision simply as a stimulus for action on grounds that are already well-
understood. This definition implies omission of problem analysis and emphasis on
solution development. The second instance is clearly truncated compared to the
first, but it does represent a fairly large proportion of the groups encountered in
actual situations. (Poole, 1983, p.336)
If the group considered its main purpose to be that of reacting to stimuli within a well
understood environment, then this would explain why the group had such an
unwillingness to accept changes in that environment, i.e., the political constraints. Poole
also suggests:
It may also be true that groups focusing on solutions are more disorganized, perhaps
because they lose sight of their goals or problems. Or it may be that groups
attempt more solutions when they are not sure how to proceed. (Poole and Roth,
1989, p.345)
Premature work on solutions will very likely be undermined by lack of agreement
about the problem, requiring the group to retrace its steps and renegotiate solutions.
(Poole, 1983, p.336)
If what Poole suggests is true, the process used in arriving at the solution selection
dt-cisions should be more disorganized than the other decisions and should be
characterized by more delays, disruptions, and reworks of solutions. The author's
observations bear this out. The solution selection decisions contained 11 of the 12 delays
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and one of the three disruptions observed. In addition, decisions 1, 2, 4, and 5 all had
solution cycles where the group felt it necessary to go back and rework their first
solution.
E. PROBLEM SELECTION
The method by which problems were selected for discussion or resolution was
primarily driven by external forces: four out of the first five problems that the group
worked on were in response to direction received from the NCA. This may be an
artificiality of the game. The CINC approved the game scenario in advance, so an
argument could be made that the CINC, not the NCA, selected four out of the first five
problems that the group worked on. A total of 57.9% of the group's time and 94.2% of
the first day was spent in response to problems originated by the NCA. As shown in
Table 4, only one problem (decision 2) was selected because of the time criticality of the
problem. This decision was about starting the TPFDD.
Two subordinate commanders provided the stimuli for the three problems selected
because of their significance, but the subordinate commanders did not impact the problem
selection until day two. This may be due to their perception of the group's purpose. If
the subordinate commanders perceived the group's purpose to be one of reacting to
stimuli within a well understood environment, then they would be mentally geared





PROBLEM # DECISIONS CUM TIME % OF TIME
SE!LECTION (MIN.SEC)
Time 1 6.16 2.1
Problem 3 84.19 28.7
Significance
Random 4 33.80 11.3
Other (NCA) 5 169.59 57.9
Total 13 293.42 100.0
The author considers it significant that the war termination goals and strategies were
not brought up as separate decisions until the end of the last day. These decisions could
have affected the overall military strategy and the allocation and employment of forces
which began on day one. One of purposes of the game was to focus on war termination
goals and strategies, and yet they were not discussed until the CINC brought them up at
end of the game. There could be several reasons why this occurred. On the first day of
the game one of the participants mentioned that he was assuming that the war termination
objectives were the same as in the previous game. If the entire group assumed this,
without discussing or challenging the assumption, it would explain why they did not ask
what the objectives were at the beginning of the game. It would also help to explain why
they concentrated on solution generation. What it does not explain is the difficulty the
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group had when it finally discussed what the war termination goals and strategies should
be (decisions 12 and 13). Another explanation is that the subordinates were in a
reactionary mode. They may have brought with them the war termination goals and
strategies from the previous game, but they viewed the purpose of the observed game as
one of reacting to a changing military environment. Having to finally decide on war
termination goals and strategies for the current environment caused the group -o re-
evaluate what had been discussed in the previous game. If the environment impacts the
war termination goals and strategies, then this re-evaluation should have occurred as soon
as the group accepted the fact that the environment of the two games was different. This
explanation does not explain why the group had so much difficulty in accepting a new
environment.
F. SOLUTION GENERATION/SELECTION
Decisions 1, 2, 4, and 5 had solution cycles where the group decided to go back and
rework their first solution. They had arrived at a solution but subsequent discussion
prompted them to consider the situation differently, and they were forced to re-evaluate
the original solution.
Nine of the solutions were nonprogrammed, and there is a direct correlation between
the length of time it took to make a decision and the solution type (programmed or
nonprogrammed). The group spent 96% of their time working on decisions that required
nonprogrammed solutions. The courses of action decisions (decisions 1, 4, 5, 8, and 11)
consumed 80.1% of the group's time and used a solution generation process that was
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different than the other decisions. In each, the subordinate commanders presented courses
of action that his individual command would take. The CINC would make minor
modifications, comment about coordinating with another subordinate commander, or just
listen. The final solution adopted by the group was a composite of the separate courses
of action put forth by the subordinate commanders.
For this type of solution generation to work each member of the group must have
a clear idea of the organizations objectives, and there must be coordinating mechanisms
between the subordinate commanders. The respective staffs of the subordinate
commanders conducted analysis and coordination, but this portion of the game was not
recorded.
In decisions 1 and 11 there was a period of discussion followed by the subordinate's
presentation of individual courses of action. In decisions I and 11 this discussion was
lengthy. The discussion served to (1) focus the group, (2) arrive at a general consensus
of what the objectives were, and (3) provide some measure of coordination between the
subordinate commanders. In decisions 4, 5, and 8 there were no initial periods of
discussion. Instead, there was a presentation of individual courses of action and then a
short period of discussion or "recap". Decision 4 dealt with the courses of action that
should be taken in the event deterrence failed. Decision 5 dealt with courses of action
for limited operations, and decision 8 dealt with courses of action for full scale
operations. By contrast, decision 1 involved deterrence actions, and decision I dealt
wiLh war termination moves. It is significant that the group felt the need for less
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discussion once the shooting started. They were clearly more familiar with what to do
during the conflict than they were on how to avoid or terminate a conflict.
This observed process of arriving at composite solutions for courses of actions is
entirely consistent with the functional organization of the command (land, sea, and air
warfare) and the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept practiced by the Navy.
Weissenger-Baylon described the CWC process as:
Solutions and problems are matched by subordinate commanders themselves.
Problem-solution matches are then presented to the flag officer as decisions
recommended for his approval. On account of time pressures on the overall
commander and his subordinates, as well as communications limitations, neither
alternative courses of actions nor justification for the decision are necessarily
provided.
The flag officer and his staff examine the decision recommendation and search
for the problem which it will solve: (I) if the problem-solution match appears
appropriate, the decision is approved as recommended; (2) if the flag officer's
broader view suggests that the proposed problem-solution match is not desireable,
an alternative decision will be approved by the flag officer and his staff; and (3) if
the flag officer does not respond, the subordinate commander may implement the
decision he himself recommended. (Weissinger-Baylon, 1986, pp.47-48)
The CWC concept works well in a naval battle-force environment, but it requires that all
participants "play from the same sheet of music." If this concept is employed at the
theater CINC level, then special attention should be paid to ensuring that participants have
the same objectives and goals. In their work with the micro-computer industry Bourgeois
and Eisenhardt found that "In high velocity environments, the more power to make
functional strategy decisions is delegated to the functional executives, the better the
performance of the firm." (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988, p.831) If the theater CINC
environment is truly a high-velocity environment, then the CWC concept should prove
to be beneficial at this level of command.
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The group considered anywhere from one to five solutions for each decision and
the average number considered was two. Some of the solutions were considered briefly
and others were explored in depth. As mentioned above, each courses of action decision
developed just one composite solution. The decisions that dealt with war termination
goals and strategies also developed just one solution. Although different alternatives and
solutions were considered, any decision that required a fairly detailed or complex solution
only developed one of the competing solutions to any great depth. The decision process
only generated one fimal solution, not two or more solutions that would each be evaluated
at a later date. Mintzberg found the same thing to be true and in 1976 wrote "The
hypothesis with the strongest support in our study is that the organization only designs
one fully-developed custom-made solution." (Mintzberg, Raininghani, and Theoret, 1976,
p.256)
The solution for each decision was selected through a bargaining process. The
observed group used a bargaining process for each solution selected even though
individual participants displayed judgment for individual choices, and the participants
referred to analysis that had been performed by their staffs'. This is to be expected, for
while the military is often associated with an autocratic form of decision making, the
environment that the group operates in dictates that bargaining would be the preferred
method. The CWC concept requires i high degree of coordination and cooperation, and
the CINC has subordinates who are strong and relatively independent. Each participant
may not agree with each decision, but the bargaining process provides a means for
building a consensus and ensures that all have a chance to voice their concerns.
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G. ROLE OF CONTROLLER
The role of the controller was to keep the group from straying too far from the
subject at hand and to ensure that the game moved along. In actuality, the controller
played the role of an independent counselor who had no vested interest and hence could
be impartial. On numerous occasions the controller assumed the role of devil's advocate
and helped to avoid groupthink. Groupthink is a pattern of conformity which has been
described as "...a collective pattern of defensive avoidance." (Janis, 1977, p.129).
Groupthink occurs when members put their affiliation with the group above the purpose
of the group and "...avoid raising controversial issues, questioning weak arguments, or
calling a halt to soft headed thinking." (Janis, 1977, p.130)
H. PROCEDURES
The procedures used by the group appeared to be well understood by all
participants. During the game there were no comments, questions, or discussion about
the procedures. The CINC guided the group but did not dominate it, although he could
have, for the participants were clearly conscious of the command hierarchy and respective
ranks. The CINC would open the floor for general discussion or he would go around the
table, as in the courses of action solutions, soliciting solutions or comments from the
participants. There was no procedural limit on the number of alternatives or options that
could be considered at one time.
In reaching agreement the group used a process called consensus with qualification.
Eisenhardt describes it as:
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.a two-step process. First, a team attempts to reach consensus by involving
everyone. If agreement occurs, the choice is made. However, if consensus is not
forthcoming, the CEO and often, the relevant VP make the choice, guided by input
from the entire team. (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.562)
This process is useful in resolving all but the most serious conflicts within a group and
increases the speed with which group decisions can be made. The use of bargaining and
consensus with qualification went a long way toward ensuring that the CINC had the
support of his subordinates when a decision was finally made. In a paper on decision
development in small groups, Poole observed:
In general, leadership behavior seems to be more definite and effective under
conditions of high consensus. With low consensus a larger number of procedural
activities functioning as leadership bids should occur and the group may be less
organized and effective. (Poole, 1983, p. 3 3 8)
If Poole's observation is correct, then the emphasis on consensus suggests a CINC tY at
would be effective in his leadership role.
Decisions 1, 4, 5, 8, and 11 dealt with courses of actions. In decisions 4, 5, and 8
the subordinates presented their respective courses of action before there was any general
discussion. These decisions all dealt with conflict with the Soviet's. The grounds for
reaching these courses of action must have been well understood for the group didn't feel
the need to build a consensus by prior discussion. The procedures used by the group
would indicate that the group was much more familiar with what courses to take during
a conflict than they were with how to deter or terminate a conflict.
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I. VISION
Vision refers to how far ahead in time the group's participants were thinking and
the breadth of their perspective. Were they concentrating exclusively on the days events
or were they anticipating events in the future? Did the group look only at the immediate
military consequences of their decisions or did they also consider how their decisions
would affect the social, political, and economic environments?
During most discussions it appeared that the group would start from a perspective
that they felt comfortable with and then expand if the time and conditions permitted. In
decision 1, when the group was discussing deterrence moves, it took over one hour before
the group began to discuss the political consequences of their military action. In this
case, the group started with military moves and eventually broadened their perspective.
On day three the group started with a decision on whether a particular unit should be
moved, and then quickly escalated their perspective to a discussion of courses of action
that should be taken for termination of the war on terms favorable to the U.S. When war
termination goals were discussed, it took prodding from the CINC to get the discussion
moving. The participants could not instantaneously transition from a discussion of
courses of action (decision 11) to a discussion of goals (decision 12). On day two the
group's perspective never broadened beyond military considerations. This is seen in their
decision to strike a Soviet target in a neutral country with no consideration of the political
repercussions. Perhaps conflict, even in a game environment, discourages a broadened
perspective. Gladstein and Reilly conducted a study of group decision making under
threat and concluded that "It appears accurate to say that an increase in threat not only
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led to an increase in internal stress, but also restricted the way in which groups processed
information." (Gladstein and Reilly, 1985, p.622) Conflict causes stress, and stress causes
a shortened and narrowed perspective where people pay less attention to the side effects
and long-range consequences of actions (George, 1980, p.49).
Table 5 shows that the group spent 66.7% of their time working on decisions that
would have an almost immediate impact, i.e., short-range decisions. By contrast they
spent only 9.4% of their time working on decisions that were long-range in nature. These
observations could lead the reader to believe that the group had a relatively short time
perception and possibly a narrow perspective. However, if the reader takes a wider
perspective of the game, it is possible to reach another conclusion. The group was
formulating a consensus for possible courses of actions for a different environment in the
realization that a future conflict could occur within that environment. With this in mind
the argument can be made that the group exhibited a great deal of vision. They had
realized that in a crisis situation "...policy makers are likely to display a narrowing of
time perspective along with other characteristic symptoms of cognitive constriction under
high stress ....." (Janis, 1977, p. 61) and were compensating for this by shifting their
decision load to a period when they had more time. Since the CINC was the instigator
behind the game, then he would have to be given much of the credit for the depth of
vision displayed.
During the game, the group's perspective varied from narrow to broad. After the
game, the group had a "hot wash-up" in which they discussed how they did. The ability
of some of the participants to detach themselves from the previous days events and
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critically evaluate the group's performance showed that given the right conditions they




DECISION # DECISIONS CUM TIME % OF TIME
IMPACT TIME (M[N.SEC)
< one week 9 195.50 66.7
< one month 1 3.33 1.1
< six months 1 66.42 22.7
< 12 months 0 0.0 0.0
> 12 months 2 27.37 9.4
Total 13 293.42 100.0
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VII. UNDERSTANDING THE THEATER CINC LFVEL ORGANIZATIONAL
DECISION PROCESS
A. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
The external environment of the observed game was characterized by a constantly
changing situation and can be accurately described as a "high-velocity" environment.
Information about the intentions of both the enemy and the NCA was often ambiguous
or nonexistent. Information on the disposition and availability of friendly forces was
generally accessible, but there was often a time delay. In a real conflict, it is possible
that the information on friendly forces would be incomplete and contain a certain amount
of error. This characterization of the external environment does not imply that it would
always be high-velocity environment, for it is conceivable that it would fluctuate over
time. Suffice it say that the external environment of the theater CINC encompasses high-
velocity environments.
The time spent in making a decision at the theater CINC level is different than that
observed for the junior levels of military command. Weissinger-Baylon recorded several
hundred flag-level decisions over a three and one-half day war game that was conducted
at a combined battleship and carrier task force level (Weissinger-Baylon, 1986, p.44).
Klein observed decision making at the brigade level and recorded 27 decisions over a five
hour period. Klein states:
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We counted 27 decisions made during the 5 hours, an average of one every 12
minutes. Even this is misleading, since it does not take into account time taken by
interruptions and communications. We estimate that about 20 of the decisions took
less than 1 minute, five took less than 5 minutes and perhaps only two were
examined for more than 5 minutes. (Klein, 1989, p.57)
By contrast, the author observed 13 decisions over a war game that lasted for three days.
The theater CINC made fewer decisions, and the decisions took longer than those made
at the brigade or naval-force level. The decision process observed at the theater CINC
level was clearly different, in the time scale sense, from the decision process recorded for
the junior commands. Since the decision process is dependent upon the environment
(Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984, pp.404-405; Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988, pp.816,
832-833) it is possible to draw the conclusion that the decision process varies with the
level of command. This is expected, for the junior commands can be viewed as buffers
that act to dampen external stimuli before they reach the senior commands. What the
theater level command sees is a "smoothed" version of an environment which is greater
than the union of the environments of the subordinate commands. If the environment of
the junior commands are more volatile than the theater level command, the following
hypotheses can be reached:
Hypothesis 1 - The length of the decision process is inversely related to the
volatility of the external environment.
When the group was faced with changes to the external environment (constraints)
that made it different than expected their initial reaction was to ignore or minimize the
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impact of the changes. When they found that they could not ignore the changes they tried
to refute them. When this failed, they tried to reverse the changes and restore the
environment to the expected. A possible reason for this behavior was that the extent of
the environmental changes rendered their existing operational plan unfeasible. They had
undoubtedly expended a significant amount of time and effort into generating the existing
operational plan, and the group displayed a clear consensus on its utility. This behavior
was observed throughout the first day of the game and leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypotheses 2 - When confronted with externally imposed constraints that make a
previously agreed upon solution unfeasible, the group's initial response will be to
change the constraints rather than change the solution. The group will change the
solution only if they fail to change the constraints.
B. APPLICABILITY OF THEORETICAL DECISION-MAKING MODELS
1. Goal Consensus
Goal consensus is "...the agreement among managers about which
organizational goals to pursue." (Daft, 1989, p.378) A theater level CINC who has
functionally oriented subordinate commanders (land, sea, and air warfare) faces a situation
where the organization design encourages the subordinate commanders to take a more
narrow organizational perspective. The costs associated with a functional organization
are ( 1 ) poor inter-unit coordination, (2) decisions pile at the top, and (3) a restricted view
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of the whole. (Nadler and Tushman, 1988, p.75) In spite of each participant's military
background, the functional organization does not encourage goal consensus among the
subordinate commanders. The CINC appeared to put a great deal of importance on
consensus, and in view of the organizational structure this is understandable.
For the most part the group seldom mentioned the term "goal": usually they
spoke of objectives or strategies. Still, goals are important in identifying and prioritizing
problems. In his discussion of decision making Daft states:
When goals are clear and agreed upon, they provide clear standards and
expectations for performance. When goals are not agreed upon, problem
identification is uncertain and management attention must be focused on gaining
agreement about goals and problem priorities. (Daft, 1989, p.3 7 9 )
If this is correct, then the group's ability to define the problem for each decision should
provide a reasonable indication of goal consensus. Reviewing the problem identification
that took place in each decision process should indicate the level of goal consensus that
existed at the start of the decision process.
In decisions 2, 3, 4, 8, and 9 the group jumped right into solution generation
and never questioned what the problem or objective was. For these decisions the group
appeared to have a high goal consensus, for they had a similar understanding of the
problem and how to solve it so that it furthered their objectives. In decisions 1 and 5 the
group proceeded directly to solution generation and then had to start over when they
realized that they did not have a clear understanding or agreement on the problem.
Before they reworked the solution, they had a period of discussion to clarify the problem.
The goal consensus would have to be considered low for these decisions. In decisions
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6, 7, 10, 11, 12, and 13 the group started the decision process with a period of open
discussion as a meanw of clarifying and reaching a consensus on what the problem and
objectives were before they proceeded to solution generation. The goal consensus would
also have to be considered low for these decisions.
The group looked to the NCA to establish their military goals with one
exception, the conduct of full scale military operations (decision 8). Instead of providing
measurable goals the NCA gave broad general guidance, and the group had a considerable
amount of trouble in translating this guide',ce into military actions and objectives.
Admiral Train, a former Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Command ai.,a former
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, has said:
It is often very useful if higher authority, such as. for example, the National
Command Authority and the people helping them do business, define the problem.
For example, in the case of Grenada, Vice Admiral Metcalf had the advantage of
having higher authority define the problem very well. As a result of that definition,
he was given a clear, concise and understandable political and military objective
that he was to pursue. However, in the absence of such clearly stated political
objectives, it is very difficult--for the military authorities in particular--to function.
A further complication is created when the stated political objective given to the
military leadership by the govermnent is not the real political objective but rather
a "displayed" political objective, one that will bear the scrutiny of the public as
opposed to one thai is really in the minds of the duly-elected and accountable
leadership." (Train, 1986, p. 301)
In decisions 1, 5, 6, and 7 the group went back to the NCA for clarification. During the
decision process for decision 11, one of the participants made the following
recommendation: "Now in war termination against the Soviet's, I would just outline our
war campaign and let the NCA decide ....." In the absence of clearly defined objectives
from the NCA the military strategy pursued by the group was determined by what was
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militarily possible. This is reflected in another comment that a participant made during
the same decision (decision 11). He said, "Let's walk through these things (NCA
guidance) and then, with the idea mat we want to see ff these things are feasible, once
we decide what it is, the course we want to head in, then we can come back if they are
feasible." What the member was suggesting to the rest of the group was that they decide
what they were going to do and then come back and see how it compared to the general
guidance received from the NCA. The group accepted this suggestion, and that is exactly
what they did.
What is emerging from all of this is a picture of how the group responds when
forced to accept a new external environment. The new external environment appears to
cause a lack of goal consensus within the group. Consequently, if specific goals and
military objectives are not provided by the NCA, then the military strategy is dictated by
the incremental nature of the generated courses of action. In effect, the military strategy
is determined piecemeal, by what is possible, not necessarily what is optimal. The
following hypotheses reflects this conclusion.
Hypotheses 3 - When faced with an unanticipated environment, the theater-wide
military strategy will be incremental unless the NCA provides specific military
goals and objectives.
In their study of strategic decision processes in high-velocity environments,
Bourgeois and Eisenhardt reached the conclusion that "In times of rapid change, people
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need an anchor for their actions, and clear, explicit goals provide this." (Bourgeois and
Eisenhardt, 1988, p.828) They then went on to formulate a hypothesis that "In high
velocity environments, the clearer and more explicitly articulated the institutional goal,
the better the performance of the firm." (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988, p.828) In
conducting this war game, the CINC was anticipating a possible external environment,
exploring military strategies for that environment, and developing a goal consensus within
his co,1nmand.
A comparison of (1) the amount of time required to reach decisions which
were initiated in response to stimuli received from the NCA with (2) the guidance
provided by the NCA suggests the following:
Hypotheses 4 - For decisions reached in response to stimuli (direction) received
from the NCA, the more general the direction received from the NCA the longer
the decision process.
2. Technical Knowledge
The theater CINC and his subordinate commanders exhibited a high degree of
military skill. This is seen in the solutions generated for the course of action decisions.
This degree of military skill is requisite, but not sufficient, for a high state of technical
knowledge since the uncertainty of the environment may constrain the application of these
skills. The group exhibited a high state of technical knowledge when operating within
an environment that was within their sphere of influence, or was familiar to them, and
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when the environment remained stable over the time required for the group to achieve
their organizational goal.
However, when operating within an environment that involved other forces, such
as the Soviet's, the group's understanding of how to achieve their organizational goal was
limited, in the time scale sense, by the uncertainty of the environment. When this
occured the group exhibited a low state of technical knowledge. The group did not know
where all the Soviet ships were, what the exact condition of the Soviet air defenses were,
what the weather would be like in the near future, or which of their assets would fail.
Their knowledge about external forces was very time dependent and decreased as the time
frame extended. The dynamic nature of conflict, where multiple parties try to act upon
each other, would preclude a high state of technical knowledge of the environment by any
one party.
Daft describes technical knowledge as:
...especially important to the problem-solution stage of decision making. When
means are well understood, the appropriate alternatives can be identified and
calculated with some degree of certainty. When means are poorly understood,
potential solutions are ill defined and uncertain. Intuition, judgement, and trial and
error become the basis for decisions. (Daft, 1989, p.379)
If technical knowledge is especially important in solution generation, then looking at
solutions should provide an indication of the group's technical knowledge for each
decision.
Decisions 1, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 11 all had incremental, i.e., "stop-gap", solutions.
This type of solution reflects uncertainty and implies a low state of technical knowledge.
Decisions 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9 had final solutions. This type of solution reflects a degree of
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certainty and implies a high state of technical knowledge. Decisions 12 and 13 present
a quandary. Both of these decisions were final but were reached implicitly. Decision 13
involved determining war termination goals, but not how to achieve them. Decision 12
was about war termination strategies. The strategies were more specific than the goals,
but again there was no obvious connection between the strategies and the group's
knowledge of how to achieve them.
If the desired solution was to arrive at a set of war termination goals and strategies,
then the group had a high technical knowledge. However, if the desired solution was to
arrive at war termination goals and strategies that were achievable or executable within
the games environment, then the group's technical knowledge is questionable since the
strategies would be influenced by Soviet actions. The author took the view that the group
had a high technical knowledge during decisions 12 and 13. The group knew how to
determine war termination goals and strategies, i.e., hold a war game. Also, one of the
stated purposes of the game was to arrive at war termination goals and strategies, and the
entire game was an exercise to determine possible military strategies.
3. Contingency Decision-Making Framework
The contingency framework says that the management science model of
decision making is used when the group has a high goal consensus and high technical
knowledge. This describes decisions 2, 3, 4, and 9. The management science model
emphasizes the almost exclusive use of analysis to make a decision (Daft, 1989, p.363).
In decisions 2, 4, and 9 this analysis was not actuqlly observed but the group's
discussions indicated that prior analysis had been done. The group was aware of the
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results of this analysis and used the results in making their decision. In decision 3 the
group performed no analysis and gave no indication of prior analysis, even though they
had a high goal consensus and technical knowledge. Instead, each participant seemed to
rely on intuition or judgment. This decision could represent a compressed or "bounded"
version of the management science model where, instead of going through a formal
analysis, the group responds by using judgment; judgment built up over years of
experience.
According to the contingency framework, decisions with a high goal consensus
and low technical knowledge should follow the incremental decision process model. This
fits the description of decision 8. The incremental decision process model is based upon
Mintzberg's discovery that "...major organizational choices are usually a series of small
choices that combine to produce the major decision." (Daft, 1989, p.369) Large problems
are solved in small steps, often on a trial-and-error basis. In decision 8 the group jumped
right into solution generation, but the environmental uncertainty forced an incremental
solution.
The contingency framework says that decisions with a high technical
knowledge and low goal consensus should conform to the Carnegie model. The Carnegie
model emphasizes a coalition building process to reach decisions (Daft, 1989, p.365).
This model recognizes that:
...organizations are also inherently political systems. Organizations are
settings in which various groups have different degrees of power and in which
decisions are outcomes of compromise and accommodation among coalitions
of different interests. (Nadler and Tushman, 1988, p.8 1)
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Decisions 6, 12, and 13 followed the Carnegie model. In each of these decisions the
main emphasis of the decision process was to reach a consensus about both the nature and
the importance of the problem and how to define the objectives.
Decisions with a low technical knowledge and low goal consensus should use
both the Carnegie model and the incremental decision process model. Decisions 1, 5, 7,
10, and 11 fit this description. In decisions 1, 5, 7, and 11 the group first took time to
form a consensus about the problem and then adopted an incremental solution in response
to environmental uncertainty. Decision 10 never arrived at a final solution, but the
alternatives which were considered were incremental in nature.
As shown in Table 6, four decisions can be classified as using the management
science model, six decisions as using the incremental decision process model, and eight
decisions as using the Carnegie model. These figures could lead the reader to believe that
the G.cision process used by the theater level CINC is best described by the Carnegie
mode:. This may be incorrect due to the limited number of decisions observed. A
corre -t conclusion is:
1. The theater level CINC uses a combination of decision processes
2 These processes encompass the management science model, the incremental
decision process model, and the Carnegie model
3 For this one war game the process depicted in the Carnegie model was observed
more frequently than 4--y other process
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TABLE 6
OBSERVED ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION- # DECISIONS WHICH USED
MAKING PROCESS PROCESS
Management Science Model 4
Carnegie Model 8
Incremental Decision Process 6
Model
The time required to make a decision varied from a low of 56 seconds to a
high of 96 minutes and 44 seconds. A review of Table 7 indicates that the decision time
is related to the decision process. In actuality, the decision time is related to agreement
(goal consensus) and uncertainty (technical knowledge) since the decision process that is
used reflects the agreement and uncertainty present during the decision. The observed
relationship between decision time, goal consensus, and technical knowledge leads to the
following hypotheses:
Hypotheses 5 - The time required to make a decision is related to goal consensus
and technical knowledge. Decisions take the least amount of time when there is a
high goal consensus and a high technical knowledge. Decisions take longer to
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reach when there is a low goal consensus or a low technical knowledge. Decisions
take the longest when both goal consensus and technical knowledge are low.
TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF DECISION PROCESS WITH DECISION TIME
ORGANIZATION # DECISIONS AVERAGE % OF
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS WHICH USED DECISION TIME
PROCESS TIME
(MIN.SEC)
Management Science Model 4 3.50 4.2
Carnegie Model only 3 13.24 13.7
Incremental Decision Process 1 33.22 11.4
Model only I
Carnegie and Incremental 5 41.34 70.7
Decision Process Model
Total 13 NA 100.0
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The internal environment was largely determined by the seminar format of the
war game, the procedures followed, and the personalities of the participants, especially
the CINC who sponsored the event and approved the procedures. The seminar format has
some distinct benefits for it allows the group to develop social routines and learn how to
function as a group in a high-velocity environment. The seminar format also allows the
researcher to observe the social routines used by the group. Organizational decision
making is a social process and, as Anderson points out, "Organizational decision making,
therefore, is not just a product of individual intellectual information processing, but also
involves social information processing." (Anderson, 1983, p.202) In addition to the
socialization process, the seminar format provides valuable experience for the participants.
Schweiger found that increasing a group's experience significantly improved the group's
performance in making strategic decisions (Schweiger, Sandberg, and Rechner, 1989, p.
767).
The game format and procedures allowed for an open exchange of information
and ideas among the participants. This benefits the researcher by providing increased
visibility into the decision process. However, this open exchange is not something that
68
can be taken for granted. In his discussion of presidential decision making George states
that "...relationships within small groups can be structured in a variety of ways and that
markedly different interaction patterns are possible." (George, 1980, p.82) He also goes
on remarks that "The behavior of groups often differs markedly under different leadership
conditions." (George, 1980, p.102)
2. Limitations
The seminar format did introduce some artificialities. Analysis was done by
the respective staffs but it was done apart from the decision-making group, either in
another room or after the daily seminar session was over. The fact that this work
occurred separately made it difficult to identify how much analysis was done (degree and
depth) and how much of it was available to the individual members of the decision-
making group.
The game had artificial tine constraints imposed on the decision processes.
Participants knew approximately how long each session would last, and there was a
timetable established which dictated how much of the scenario would be covereo each
day. The amount of time that the group could allocate to any one decision was limited
and reduced the time available for other decisions. The recorded decision times represent
how the group chose to allocate their time, not the time that it would actually take to
reach a similar decision in a real situation.
The controller played an important role in keeping the group focused,
especially during the first day. In a real-world situation, he would not be there and the
group nay spend more of their time on tangents or unrelated topics. Of course, the CINC
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could compensate for this by assigning the role of "controller" or "devil's advocate" to
someone within the decision-making group.
The participants did not have to live with, or face up to, the consequences of
their decisions; after all, it was only a game. This reduces the psychological stress and
should impact the group's behavior and decisions (Janis, 1977, pp.46-49). McQuie has
noted that people respond differently in ganms than they do in combat: casualty rates in
war games are substantially higher than observed in actual battle. McQuie states:
War games and simulations employ casualties as an internal criterion for
terminating simulated battles. Casualty rates ranging from 15 percent to 30 percent
per day are not unusual in big simulations of combat. This extreme level of
casualties results in a tempo of combat in the games, however, that has not actually
occurred in the past and might not be sustainable in the future, given the limits of
human nature.
The reasons war games generate such high casualty rates, while widely
discussed, remain obscure. Perhaps combat simulations do not reproduce the
decision to desist from a faltering attack or to withdraw from a hopeless defense
This defect, happily, has not been observed in those doing the actual fighting.
Th.• casualties incurred by losing forces appear to have been fewer than usually
envisioned by those of us concerned with either command of troops or analysis of
war. (McQuie, 1987, p.34)
This limitation would be seen in any type of war game and would not be restricted to the
seminar format. George has identified a similar distinction between research experiments
and real-world decision-making groups:
The emotions aroused among real-world decisionmakers stem from the perceived
consequences of the difficult and often distressing choices they must make which
may affect themselves and their own individual career prospects as well as the lives
of many people; indeed, in foreign-policymaking, the peace of the world may be
at stake. Decisions made in laboratory experiments, on the other hand, tend to
mean much less to the participating subjects and to be objectively much less
consequential in other ways. (George, 1980, pp.82-83)
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The format appeared to encourage the use of oral situation updates and
briefings. For the researcher, this is a double-edged sword. Oral briefings allow the
researcher to determine when the group received certain information and to observe the
group's response to the different information sources. They also provides less of an audit
trail. Oral communication provides a means of facilitating the exchange of information;
however, it does not encourage documentation: '"The nature of managerial work introduces
a bias in favor of oral channels of information at the expense of documented sources."
(Mintzberg, Raisinghai, and Theoret, 1989, p.7 5 ) Janis has noted that this reliance on oral
briefings is common in top-level executives:
Top-level executives in government, business, or welfare organizations are likely
to turn to one or another of the key members on their staffs to supply a nutshell
briefing, and to rely solely on the single channel of information.... (Janis, 1989,
p.4 1 )
A "nutshell briefing" is defined as follows: "When facing a complicated policy problem,
save time and effort by getting someone who has looked into the issues to tell you what
it is all about, 'in a nutshell,' and then decide." (Janis, 1989, p.4 0)
If a decision-making group is composed of a CINC and his subordinate
commanders, then the size of the group is dependent upon the command structure and,
to a lesser extent, the physical location of the various subordinate commands which
influences the availability of personnel. In this particular case, the size was slightly larger
than expected in policy making groups since:
Most real world decisionmaking groups tend to be quite small--between two and
seven members according to one study--and their size tends to be reduced at times
of crisis, or when 'crucial choices' have to be made. This is true, for instance, of
the foreign-policy groups within the U.S. government that developed plans in
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several recent crises, including Korea (1950), Indochina (1954), Cuba (1962),
Vietnam (1965), Cambodia (1970), and the Arab-Israeli conflict of October 1973.
(George, 1980, p.83)
The reduction in the size of the decision-making t•oup when crucial decisions are made
during conventional, non-crisis, war situations is exemplified by the American decision
to reconquer the Philippines during World War H. This was a strategic choice in the war
against Japan and was dis.puted for the better part of a year. The final decision was
ultimately made by just three people, President Roosevelt, General McArthur, and
Admiral Nimitz (Quin, Mintzberg, and James, 1988, p.149). The relatively large size of
the observed decision-making group (10 participants) may have been one of the
artificialities of the game. Some of the subordinate commanders had to travel extensive
distances to attend, and the author finds it hard to envision that in a time of crisis the
CINC would have them spend their time traveling instead of guiding their command's
activities. In a crisis, the decision group could be composed of the people readily
available with the others being contacted by message or secure phone.
B. OBSERVATION METHODS
1. Video
Using video as a means of data collection has definite advantages. Video
provides an independent record that the researcher can view as many times as necessary.
The ability to view the data multiple times allows the researcher to concentrate on one
aspect at a time without losing the rest of the data. A video record also provides the
opportunity to verify previous observations and to correct mistakes. Perhaps the greatest
72
/ A&
advantage of video is that it provides a common data base from which multiple
researchers can work without destroying the integrity of the data. In their discussion of
data collection techniques, Marshall and Rossman mention the following advantages of
video data collection:
Film is particularly valuable for discovery and validation. It documents nonverbal
behavior and communication, such as facial expressions and emotions. Film
preserves activity and change in original form. It can be used in the future to take
advantage of new methods of seeing, analyzing, and understanding the process of
change. Film is an aid to the researcher when the nature of what is sought is
known but the elements of it cannot be discovered because of the limitations of the
human eye. Film allows for the preservation and study of data from nonrecurring,
disappearing, or rare events. With films, interpretation of information can be
validated by another researcher. Feedback can be obtained on authenticity of
interpretation and it can be retaken to correct errors." (Marshall and Rossman, 1989,
p.86)
There are also limitations involved in usii-g video for data collection. The
quality of the video is dependent upon the expertise of the person(s) doing the recording
and, to a lesser extent, the type of event being recorded. The researcher only gets to see
what the camera sees- for a viewer it is much like going to a tennis match without being
ablr to move your head after you sit down. Any off-screen events, interactions, or
documents are not recorded. Another limitatioi. is that video is capable of providing
enough data to overwhelm the researcher and cause him or her to miss "the big picture."
(Marshall and Rossman, 1989, p.104)
Video proved to be an excellent means of iecording data for the observed war
game. Still, the thoroughness of the data could be increased by complementing the video
record with the following additional forms of data:
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1. On-site observations during the game
2. A documentation package consisting of all game related documents available to
the decision-making group
3. Interviews with the gaming facility personnel who planned and conducted the
game
2. Coding
a. Applicability of Coding Method
The variables used to code the decision processes are contained in
Appendix A. The majority of the variables were obtained from published research articles
on organizational decision making; a few were originated by the author. These variables
provided a common framework for observing each of the decision processes and were
used to distill the data contained in the video record of the war game. Free form
observations were also made for eý!ch decision process. When these two types of
observations, coded and free form, were combined, they provided the picture of the
decision processes contained in this thesis.
The coded variables worked reasonably well but warrant modification.
Four of the variables proved to have negligible value. This may be due to the seminar
format of the game, or it may be peculiar to this particular decision-making group. These
four variables are (1) phase, (2) information evaluation, (3) trigger, and (4) number of
participants. The author also experienced difficulty in coding the variables of problem,
solution, decision type, and impact time.
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Problem and solution had possible values of (1) programmed and (2)
nonprogrammed. nais did not provide enough variety to accurately record how the group
viewed the different problems and solutions. If the group was faced with a problem or
solution that deviated from the familiar, then the definitions of progr'imaed and
nonprogrammed required the variable to be coded as nonprogrammed. However, at times
the group still treated the problem or solution as programmed. In these cases, the group
did not appear to consider the deviation significant. To accommodate this behavior, the
author recommends that the variables of problem and solution have a range of at least
four values. Suggested values ar' (1) very programmed, (2) programmed, (3)
nonprogrammed, and (4) very nonprogrammed.
The variable of decision type had values that were not individually
defined prior to coding. During coding, this led to ambiguity and subjective
interpretation. Clear definitions for each possible vah,_, should reduce this subjectivity.
The variable of time impact should be redefined and possibly renamed.
All of the decisions require" some sort of action in the immediate future, so the argument
could be made that they all had an immediate effect. The distinction that provides an
indication of the group's vision is whether the decision was geared toward guiding events
at a designated time in the future.
b. Other Possible Coding Methods
The coding method that was used originated from decision theory.
Argumentation and communication are two other disciplines that may prove useful in
understanding decision making at the theater CINC level. The group's emphasis on
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consensus building and bargaining indicate that the framing and communication of
arguments would be an important part of the decision process. The author's observations
bear this out. Putnamn and Geist have noted that "Bargaining is accomplished through
arguments, reasoning, and persuasive appeals." (Putnam and Geist, 1985, p.226) In his
study of presidential decision making, George makes the comment that "...small informal
groups may produce more examples of genuine persuasion and, because the participants
know that persuasion is possible, the arguments may be better." (George, 1980, p. 86 )
Coding the communications within a decision-making group could indicate transition
points in reasoning and could identify recurring themes or concerns. Coding the group's
arguments may provide insight into (1) logic flow, (2) how the group views specific
problems and solutions, (3) the impact that various sources of information have on
opinions, and (4) relationships between decisions. Equating the logic flow with the
decision process could provide additional information about how the group makes
decisions.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF SEMINAR WAR GAMES
1. Topics/Content
The two decisions which gave the group the most difficulty were the decisions
on courses of action for war deterrence and war termination (decisions 1 and 11). In the
author's opinion, both of these subjects (deterrence and termination) should be
emphasized during CINC level war games. Weissinger-Baylon has observed that peak
flag-level decision loads occur during period of international tension when "...commanders
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and their staffs are stressed by requirements to position their forces for battle, to strike
before the enemy and to avoid accidental or premature triggering of a conflict."
(Weissinger-Baylon, 1986, p.44) If this is correct, then decisions about courses of action
for war deterrence and termination could be made under fairly intense conditions. Janis
and George have noted that decision makers are likely to have a reduced time perspective
in a crisis situation (Janis, 1977, p.61; George, 1980, p.49). In addition, Gladstein and
Reilly have found that "...members will react to external environmental threat by using
less information and fewer communication channels and by having less interaction than
they would under nonthreatening conditions." (Gladstein and Reilly, 1985, p.622) This
restriction in information processing will lead to inferior decisions unless ameliorated by
prior planning and crisis training (Nunamaker and others, 1988, p.28). If courses of
action for war deterrence and termination gave the group difficulty during a game, then
it is quite likely that they will give the group increased difficulty during a real situation.
The decision-making group can compensate for this by concentrating on these areas
during war games. War games provide the group with the opportunity to plan and
practice their response and thereby reduce the likelihood of poor decisions (Nunamaker
and others, 1988, p.28).
Two other subjects that, in the author's opinion, should be included in all
CINC level war games are war termination goals and strategies. In the observed war
game, the war termination goals and strategies were the last two decisions made, even
though these decisions could have affected the overall military strategy and the allocation
and employment of forces which began on day one. A review of literature on real-world
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decision-making groups indicates that the observed pattern is a common one. Anderson
conducted a detailed analysis of archival documents from the Cuban missile crisis. One
of his conclusions is that "...the act of making decisions led to the discovery of goals."
(Anderson, 1983, p.201) Anderson goes on to say:
...the standard description assumes that decision makers identify goals as a first
step. This implies that decision making is goal-directed. The goals serve as the
benchmark from which alternatives are sought and then evaluated. The evidence
from the crisis, however, suggests that goals are discovered throughout the course
of making a decision. (Anderson, 1983, p.203)
Weick also found this same pattern to be true. In his discussion of organizations he
states:
This sequence in which actions precede goal definition may well be a more accurate
portrait of organizational functioning. The common assertion that goal consensus
must occur prior to action obscures the fact that consensus is impossible unless
there is something tangible around which it can occur. And the 'something
tangible' may well turn out to be actions already completed. Thus it is entirely
possible that goal statements are retrospective rather than prospective. (Weick, 1979,
p.18)
One way for the theater level CINC to avoid an incremental military strategy during a
conflict is to have war termination goals and strategies in place prior to the outbreak of
the conflict. A way to accomplish this is by using war games to determine the goals and
strategies for potential environments. The time available for any one war game is limited,
and the determination of goals and strategies are too important to leave to chance. If war
termination goals and strategies are going to be discussed last, then the author
recommends that a specific amount of time be reserved for these subjects.
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2. Procedures
The only time the group questioned the validity of any of the information
provided to them was when they debated the validity of the political constraints during
decision 1. In a game situation this may be desired, for the players are supposed to
operate within the confines of the game. However, practicing the acceptance of all
information may encourage this behavior in nongame situations. Janis has observed that
in real-world situations, decision makers will use whatever information is at hand, even
though the information comes from sources with varying degrees of credibility (Janis,
1989, pp. 93-94). Often the information is biased in favor of a particular course of action
(Janis. 1989, p.41) or in an attempt to distort or withhold bad news (Janis, 1989, p.246).
Even if the information is not intentionally biased, it may have critical uncertainties left
out, oversimplified, or deemphasized (George, 1980, p.21). Clearly, all information is not
of the same value and credibility. The author recommends that:
1. During a war game the participants receive a certain amount of conflicting
information, i.e., disinformation
2. The procedures of the game allow the participants to question the validity and
timeliness of information received during the course of the game
One of the strengths of the observed game was the open exchange of
information and ideas among the decision-making group. While this is dependent upon
more than procedures, the procedures that are used can certainly encourage this openness.
In a military decision-making group, which relies upon consensus and practices the CWC
concept, this may be especially important. George suggests "...that when committees are
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formed from members of a formal authority structure (such as a government), the
members' ranks in the larger system may well affect their rank in the committee in a way
which is not beneficial to the decision." (George, 1980, p.88) The theater level CINC and
his subordinate commanders are not a committee, but procedures which do not
compensate for the impact of the different ranks may restrict the flow of ideas. Likewise,
procedures which don't reduce the impact of a dominating leader (not the case in the
observed war game) may effect the quality of the decisions:
...an assertive leader may promote a feeling among group members that they are
only fact-gatherers and expediters and that all value questions are his sole
prerogative. This may lead not merely to a diffusion of responsibility but to its
displacement upon the executive; thus, members may vest their consciences in the
leader, ignoring the moral or ethical considerations pertinent to the policy options
being discussed. (George, 1980, p.101)
Successful committees are also associated with leaders who... do not control heavily
on content issues. Content suggestions and evaluations should be broadly (though
not equally) distributed among the other members. If a leader overcontrols on
content, he is likely to produce conflict or superficial agreement and inhibition.
(George, 1980, p.101)
Superficial agreement may prove detrimental during the execution of a decision. Janis
has found that:
Although leaders can exercise a great deal of power and influence, they certainly
do not always get their own way. In fact, subordinates fairly often do not
implement policy decisions in the way the leaders want ....." (Janis, 1989, p.2 6 6 )
Janis points out that this can be reduced through persuasion and by overcoming objections
(Janis, 1989, p.266). Decision-making procedures which actively involve all participants
and encourage open discussion and exchange of ideas will certainly go a long way
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towards reducing both superficial agreement and inhibition and the inherent problems
which accompany them.
D. CONTINGENCY DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
The contingency decision-making framework characterizes decisions by the level
of uncertainty (high or low) associated with the problem and solution (Figure 1).
Decisions can also be categorized as programmed and nonprogrammed. Programmed
refers to decisions that are repetitive or well defined and have a low uncertainty
associated with them. Nonprogrammed refers to decisions that are novel or ill defined
and have a high uncertainty associated with them. (Daft, 1989, p.3 5 6 )
Applying the terms of programmed and nonprogrammed to problems and solutions
would appear to be a logical extension. Programmed problems or solutions would be
repetitive or well defined and reflect low uncertainty. Likewise, nonprogrammed
problems or solutions would be nonrepetitive or ill defined and reflect high uncertainty.
The terms of programmed and nonprogrammed should be interchangeable with the terms
of high and low certainty within the contingency decision-making framework. However,
when this occurs there are inconsistencies between the contingency decision-making
framework and the author's observations. Decision 8 is a good example of this
inconsistency.
In decision 8, the group was working with an nonprogrammed problem, which
would indicate high uncertainty, and yet they had a definite goal consensus about what
to do. The solution was incremental, i.e., "stop-gap", which reflects low technical
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knowledge. The framework indicates that decisions with a high goal consensus and low
technical knowledge will use the incremental decision process model; this agrees with the
observations. However, both the problem and the solution were nonprogrammed.
According to the framework, the decision process for decisions that have nonprogrammed
problems and solutions should have been a combination of the Carnegie and incremental
l-cision process models (Figure 2). This disagrees with the observations. Three obvious
possibilities for this inconsistency are (1) coding errors, (2) incorrect definitions, (i.e.,
nonprogrammed d,'es not reflect high uncertainty), or (3) disparities between the "real
world" and the framework.
The framework consists of a two-by-two matrix. Goal consensus and technical
knowledge are either high or low, and problems and solutions have either a high or low
uncertainty. If the terms of programmed and nonprogrammed are used, then problems
and solutions are either programmed or nonprogrammed. This appears to be a definite
limitation of the framework. The author's observations of the war game indicate that
there are varying degrees of uncertainty, and two values do not provide enough variety
to accurately document the level of uncertainty. Somewhere between the two extremes
the group crosses thresholds that determines how the group views the problem or solution.
These thresholds would undoubtedly vary according to (1) the group's general experience
level and (2) the group's experience with each particular problem or solution. The two-
by-two matrix is good for conceptualizing how agreement and uncertainty affect the
decision process, but it does not offer enough giaaularity to represent the real world.
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A four-by-four matrix is offered as one means of increasing the accuracy of
the framework. This matrix size represents a trade-off between coding difficulty and
granularity. Goal consensus and technical knowledge could have one of four values.
Suggested values are (1) very high, (2) high, (3) low, or (4) very low. Problems and
solutions could have one of four values: (1) very low uncertainty, (2) low uncertainty, (3)
high uncertainty, or (4) very high uncertainty. Figure 3 shows how this matrix would
look with the terms of programmed and nonprogrammed used in place of low and high
uncertainty. The management science model would still be in the upper left hand comer
(cell 1) but would now be a--- Aated with very programmed problems and solutions or
with very high goal consensus and technical knowledge. The decision process associated
with all but the comer cells would vary according to the group and circumstances. This
added granularity would allow the contingency decision-making framework to represent




Very High High Low Very Low
Very Coil 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 Coll 4
High Problem: very Problem: Problem: Problem: very
programmed programmed nonprogrwomed nonprograimed
Solution: Solution: very Solution: very Solution: very




High Cell 5 Cell 6 Cell 7 Cell 8
Problem: very Problem: Problem: Problem: very
programmed programmed nonprogrammed nonprogrammed
Solution: Solution: Solution: Solution:
programmed programed programmed programmed
Technical
Knowledge Low Cell 9 Cell 10 Cell 11 Cell 12
Problem: very Problem: Problem: Problem: very
programmed programmed nonprogramed programmed
Solution: Solution: Solution: Solution:
nonprogrammed nonprogrammed nonprogrammed nonprogrammed
Very Cell 13 Cell 14 Cell 15 Cell 16
Low Problem: very Problem: Problem: Problem: very
programmed programmned nonprogrammed nonprogrammed
Solution: Solution: very Solution: very Solution: very
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The reader should keep in mind that this thesis describes the decisions made during
one particular war game. The observations pertain to a single scenario, set of players,
game format, and command relationships. To say that the conclusions and hypotheses
drawn from these observations are applicable to all theater CINCs would be presumptuous
and incorrect. This thesis does not provide a complete understanding of the
organizational decision process at the theater CINC level. What it does provide is a
partial understanding and a point of departure for future studies. All conclusions and
hypotheses contained in this theses refer to the theater CINC level of command and need
to be empirically tested in future studies.
B. GENERAL
The theater CINC operates in an external environment that encompasses "high-
velocity" environments; environments which are characterized by constantly changing
situations. Conducting a seminar-format war game allows the CINC and his subordinate
commanders (the observed decision-making group) to develop social routines and learn
how to function as a group, within a high-velocity environment. The seminar-format war
gaine also serves to familiarize the group with potential external environments, and
enables them to shift their decision load to a period when they have more time and are
85
under less stress. The familiarization process allows the CINC and his subordinate
commanders to build a consensus on goals, strategies, and potential courses of action.
The decision process which occurs at the theater CINC level is different, in the time
sense, from junior levels of command. The theater CINC is called upon to make fewer
decisions within the same time period as the junior commands and therefore has more
time available for each decision.
C. GOAL CONSENSUS
The functional organization of the command places a great deal of importance on
goal consensus. The theater CINC and his subordinate commanders initially displhy a
low goal consensus for unfamiliar problems and a high goal corsensus for familiar
problems. The group reaches a goal consensus !or unfamiliar problems by having an
open discussion that continues until a general consensus emerges. This discussion ensures
that all have an opportunity to voice their concerns and encourages coordination and
cooperation between the subordinate commanders. The CINC uses consensus with
qualification, a technique which is useful in resolving all but the most serious conflicts
within a group and increases the speed with which decisions can be made.
The theater CINC and his subordinates are familiar with the situation of full scale
conflict with the Soviet Union and consequently have a high goal consensus when they
are faced with this situation. When faced with deciding war deterrence or war
termination actions for an unfamiliar external environment, the group initially displays a
low goal consensus and looks to the NCA to establish the military goals. In the absence
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of specific military goals and objectives from the NCA, the group develops their own
consensus on military objjectives and adopts an incremental military strategy.
D. TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE
The theater CINC and his subordinate commanders have a high degree of military
skills. This is requisite, but not sufficient, for a high state of technical knowledge, for the
uncertainty of the environment may constrain the application of these skills. The group
exhibits a high state of technical knowledge when operating within an environment that
is within their sphere of influence, or which is familiar to them, and when the
environment remains stable over the time required for the group to achieve their
organizational goal. However, when operating within an environment that involves other
forces, such as the Soviet's, the group's understanding of how to achieve their
organizational goal is limited, in the time scale sense, by the uncertainty of the
environment. When this type of environment occurs the group exhibits a low state of
technical knowledge. Solutions are selected through a bargaining process, and the group
uses incremental solutions to compensate for uncertainty in the environment. When
confronted with externally imposed constraints that make a previously agreed upon
solution unfeasible, the group's initial response is to change the constraints rather than
,;iange the solution. The group will change the solution only if they fail to change the
constraints.
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E. APPLICABLE ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS OF DECISION MAKING
The theater level CINC uses a combination of decision processes. These processes
include:
1. The management science model
2. The Carnegie model
3. The incremental decision process model
4. A composite process which is a sequential combination of the Carnegie model and
the incremental decision process
5. A "bounded" management science model where judgment is used in place of
analysis
The process characterized by the Carnegie model is used more frequently than any other
process.
The time required to make a decision is related to goal consensus and to technical
knowledge. Decisions take the least amount of time when there is a high goal consensus
and a high state of technical knowledge, and these conditions lead to the decision process
depicted by the management science model. Decisions take longer to reach when there
is a low goal consensus or a low state of technical knowledge. Decisions take the longest
when both goal consensus and technical knowledge are low, and the resulting decision
process can be characterized by a composite of the Carnegie and the incremental decision
process models.
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F. RESEARCH UTILITY OF VIDEO OF WAR GAMES
Video records of theater level CINC war games are valuable sources of data on
organizational decision making at this generally unexplored level of command. To date,
much of the research done on military decision making has been focused on decision
making by individuals at levels of command that are junior to the theater CINC. Theater
level war games provide a prime avenue of research for exploring the organizational
decision process that occurs at the theater CINC level of command, and a video record
increases the utility of this research approach.
Video records of war games provide copious amounts of auditable data from which
multiple researchers can work without contaminating or destroying the integrity of the
data. Even so, these video records have their limitation. They only capture what is in
front of the camera and would be more useful if complimented by additional forms of
data, specifically, on site observations, documentation, and interviews. The video record
also reflects all of the limitations and artificialities of the game format, and this should
be taken into account in any research.
G. ROLE OF THE CINC IN SETTING CONFLICT GOALS AND STRATEGIES
The theater CINC plays a vital role in determining the theater wide military goals
and strategies during a war or conflict. In the author's opinion, if the theater CINC does
not determine the goals and strategies prior to the outbreak of the conflict, they quite
likely will not be determined until after the fact. Subordinate commanders who are
functionally organized (land, sea, and air warfare) are apt to take a restricted view, and
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decisions are going to migrate to the CINC level (Nadler and Tushman, 1988, p.75). In
a crisis this condition is aggravated as individual time perspectives constrict (Janis, 1977,
p.61), and the decision-making group increasingly relies upon the leader (CINC) for
direction (George, 1980, p.102). When faced with an unanticipated external environment,
the decision-making group initially exhibits a low goal consensus and looks to the next
level of command, in this case the NCA, to establish military goals and strategies.
However, Anderson and Weick have found that organizational goals are often discovered
retrospectively, through post facto actions and decisions (Anderson, 1983, p.201; Weick,
1979, p.18). In the absence of an existing set of military goals and strategies, the
implemented military strategy is incremental, based upon what is possible not what is
optimal. The way to provide a coherent military strategy is to have a strategy in place
before the outbreak of hostilities; this can be done by a CINC through war games. The
establishment of goals and strategies prior to the outbreak of a conflict is perhaps one of
the more significant contributions that a theater level CINC can make.
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APPENDIX A
DEFINITIONS, DECISION VARIABLES, AND CODING SHEET
A. DEFINITIONS
The domain of this study is the organizational decision-making process that occurs
at the theater CINC level of command during times of conflict or war. Definitions
applicable to the domain of study are given below.
1. DECISION - A conclusion reached by the members of the decision-making
group, implicitly or explicitly, that involves a strategic issue and is about something that
the group can act upon or influence.
2. DECISION PROCESS - "...a set of actions and dynamic factors that begins
with the identification of a stimulus for action and ends with the specific commitment to
action." (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976, p.246)
3. GROUP - Two or more people.
4. HIGH-VELOCITY ENVIRONMENT - An environment where there is a
rapid and discontinuous change in the availability and disposition of friendly and hostile
forces, technology, and political constraints on the military options, such tiat the
information used by the decision makers is often inaccurate, incomplete, •r obsolete.
5. STRATEGIC ISSUE - An issue that has a scope and content capable of




The following variables were used to provide an initial framework for structuring
observations of the organizational decision processes used at the theater CINC level of
command. These variables are based upon decision theory. The majority were obtained
from published research articles on organizational decision making; a few were originated
by the author.
1. CONTROL OF PROCESS BY CINC - Whether the CINC exercised strict
control over the group decision process. Possible values were: yes, no, or combination.
A yes value was indicative of a very structured hierarchy in which the CINC indicated
who may speak, or, where the members of the group had to be acknowledged by the
CINC before they could speak. A no value was indicative of a loosely structured
hierarchy in which each member of the group felt free to participate, and there was
spontaneous interaction among the members. Combination was when the control of the
process varied between yes and no values. Poole has related a preference for procedural
order to low group consensus (Poole, 1983, p.338).
2. DECISION IMPACT TIME - The time before the effect of the decision was
felt within the command. Possible values for this variable were one week or less, one
month or less, six months or less, 12 months or less, or more than 12 months. The
coding of this variable was intended to provide an indication of how far ahead, in time,
the group thought.
3. DECISION REACHED - Whether a decision was actually reached by the
decision-making group. Possible values for this variable were explicit, implicit, or no.
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Explicit meant that the group openly arrived at a decision. Implicit meant that the group
arrived at a decision even though it was not openly expressed as such. No meant that the
group never reached a solution. This variable was coded to identify (1) the decision
processes which ended without reaching a decision or (2) the means by which the
decision was reached.
4. DECISION RESOLUTION - Whether the decision was final or temporary.
Possible values for this variable were final or stop-gap. The coding of this variable was
intended to identify whether the group used incremental solutions.
5. DECISION SUBJECT - The topic of the decision. This variable had no set
range of values.
6. DECISION TYPE - The general decision category. Possible values were
information collection, goal definition, problem definition, solution selection, or process
oriented. This variable was used to segregate the observed decisions into different
categories.
7. DELAYS - A type of breakpoint in the decision process "...when the group
cycles back to repeat or rework previously a problematic issue or to adapt to newly
discovered contingencies." (Poole, 1989, pp.328-329) This variable had a numeric value
which indicated the number of observed delays in the decision process. Poole relates
delays to task complexity and group consensus (Poole, 1983, p.339; Poole and Roth,
1989, p.329).
8. DISRUPTIONS - A type of breakpoint in the decision process, "...when a
major conflict halts the group's progress, or when failures cause the group to reconsider
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its work" (Poole, 1989, p.329). This variable had a numeric value which indicated the
number of observed disruptions in the decision process. Poole relates disruptions to task
difficulty and group consensus (Poole, 1983, p.339; Poole and Roth, 1989, p.329).
9. EVALUATION OF INFORMATION - The effort that the group, or any
member of the group, made to evaluates the information that was available before using
the information in the decision process. Possible values for this variable were source
questioned, validity questioned, none evident, or other. O'Reilly points out that unlike
laboratory data, real-world data is often ambiguous and may have varying degrees of
credibility (O'Reilly, Chatman, and Anderson, 1987, p.609). Janis suggests that decision
makers often fail to consider this fact (Janis, 1989, pp.93-94). The coding of this variable
was intended to identify whether the group questioned available information.
10. EXECUTION TRIGGERS - A date, event, or set of circumstances that was
used to release or activate the implementation of a decision. For instance; if fired upon
you are to return fire. Possible values were yes or no. Bourgeois and Eisenhardt have
related the use of execution triggers to performance in high velocity environments
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988, p.829).
11. INFORMATION COLLECTION - An effort by the group to obtain
information to use in the decision process. Possible values were none, normal, or directed
telescope. Normal referred to all information that came to the group on a regular basis,
without using special requests. A directed telescope referred to "... cutting through
established channels and directly gathering the information ... needed ....." (Van Creveld,
1985, p.75). This term referred to obtaining information from subordinate commands or
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units. None implied that the group made no effort to collect additional information during
the decision-making process. Eisenhardt suggests that fast decision makers use more
information than slow decision makers (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.544) and that the use of real-
time information increases the speed of the decision process (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.549).
12. NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS - The number of the decision-making group
who participated in the decision process. This variable had a numeric value and was
coded to determine if the decision-making process was dominated by a limited number
of group members.
13. NUMBER OF SOLUTIONS - The number of solutions that were considered
by the group during the decision process. This variable had a numeric value. Eisenhardt
suggests that faster decisions are associated with more alternatives (solutions) (Eisenhardt,
1989, pp.555-556). Mintzberg states that organizations will only design one solution if
it is custom made (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976, p.256).
14. PHASE OF THE GAME - The phase of the game within which each of the
observed decisions occurred. Possible values for this variable were pre-conflict, conflict,
or post-conflict. Pre-conflict were all decisions which occurred prior to the outbreak or
declaration of hostilities (exchange of rounds). Conflict referred to all decisions that took
place between the outbreak of hostilities and the cessation of hostilities. Post-conflict
referred to all decisions that occurred after the cessation of hostilities. This variable was
coded to determine if there was a relationship between decision process and phase.
15. PROBLEM - A question or situation that presented doubt, perplexity, or
difficulty. Possible values were programmed or nonprogrammed. Programmed referred
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to problems that were repetitive or well defined. Nonprogrammed referred to problems
that were unique, noncommon, or ill defined. Decision theory indicates that the
uncertainty associated with a problem impacts the decision process used by a decision-
making group (Daft, 1989, pp.3 79 -3 8 3 ).
16. PROBLEM SELECTION - The process by which problems were selected
for discussion or solution. Possible values for this variable were time ranking, problem
significance ranking, random, or other. This variable was coded to determine whether a
consistent process was used to decide the next focus of the group or whether the problem
selection process was dependent upon another variable.
17. SOLUTION - A possible answer to the problem, one possible course of
action. Possible values were programmed or nonprogrammed. Programmed referred to
solutions that were repetitive or well defined. Nonprogrammed referred to solutions that
were unique, noncommon, or ill defined. Decision theory indicates that the uncertainty
associated with a solution impacts the decision process used by a decision-making group
(Daft, 1989, pp.379-383).
18. SOLUTION SELECTION - The method by which the selected solution was
arrived at. Possible values were judgment, analysis, or bargaining. Judgment was defined
as where "...one individual makes a choice in his own mind with procedures that he does
not, perhaps cannot, explain;...." (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976, p.258).
Analysis was where factual evaluation was carried out. Bargaining was where
"...selection is made by a group of decision makers with conflicting goal systems, each
exercising judgement ....." (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976, p.258). This
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variable was coded to (1) determine whether the group used analysis and (2) to provide
visibility into the degree of emphasis which the group placed upon consensus.
19. SOURCE OF SOLUTION(S) - The originator or presenter of solutions during
the decision process. Possible values were CINC, Subordinate Commander, Standing
Operating Procedures (SOP), or other. This variable could have multiple values for each
decision. This variable was used to identify if the group relied upon one or multiple
sources for solutions.
20. SPEAKING PATTERN - The sequence in which the group members spoke
during the decision process. Possible values were random or sequential. Random
referred to a speaking pattern among the group that varied and had no set pattern.
Sequential refers to a speaking pattern that was structured, i.e., participants spoke in a
prescribed order. The speaking pattern was coded to provide insight into the procedures
used by the group.
21. STIMULI - The agent, action, or state that evoked the decision. Possible
values were Internal (CINC, staff, subordinate commanders) or External (above CINC,
enemy, other). Coding the stimuli provided another means of categorizing the decisions
and provided visibility into whether the group was initiating the decisions ot responding
to external influences.
22. TIME - The amount of time it took to complete the decision process. The
time required to make a decision is dependent upon many of the other variables and is
commonly used in decision research.
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